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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COM

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AZ CORP COMMISSION
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IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF)
TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR)
APPROVAL OF ITS 2016 RENEWABLE)
ENERGY STANDARD AND TARIFF)
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN.)

DOCKET NO. E-01933A-15-0239

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF)
TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY FOR)
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF JUST AND)
REASONABLE RATES AND CHARGES)
DESIGNED TO REALIZE A REASONABLE)
RATE OF RETURN ON THE FAIR VALUE OF)
THE PROPERTIES OF TUCSON ELECTRIC)
POWER COMPANY DEVOTED TO ITS)
OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE STATE)
OF ARIZONA AND FOR RELATED)
APPROVALS.)

DOCKET NO. E-01933A-15-0322

Arizona Corporation Commission
DOCKETED

JUN 3 2016

DOCKETED BY

NOTICE OF FILING DIRECT TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL P. GORMAN

The United States Department of Defense and all other Federal Executive Agencies
("DoD/FEA"), through undersigned counsel, hereby files the Direct Testimony of Michael P.
Gorman.

Dated this 2nd day of June, 2016

Respectfully submitted,

Kyle J. Smith

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7 For
8 The United States Department of Defense
9 And
10 All Other Federal Executive Agencies
11
12
13
14

15 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

16
17 The original and thirteen (13) copies of the foregoing is being transmitted Federal Express
18 overnight delivery this 2nd day of June, 2016, to be received and filed on the 3rd day of June, 2016
19 with:

20
21 Docket Control Division
22 Arizona Corporation Commission
23 1200 West Washington Street
24 Phoenix, Arizona 85007

25
26 Copies of the foregoing were also transmitted via regular U.S. Mail or electronic mail to
27 all parties on the service list on this 2nd day of June, 2016.
28
29
30


Kyle J Smith

**BEFORE THE
ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION)
OF TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER)
COMPANY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT)
OF JUST AND REASONABLE RATES)
AND CHARGES DESIGNED TO)
REALIZE A REASONABLE RATE OF)
RETURN ON THE FAIR VALUE OF THE)
PROPERTIES OF TUCSON ELECTRIC)
POWER COMPANY DEVOTED TO ITS)
OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE)
STATE OF ARIZONA AND FOR)
RELATED APPROVALS)

**DOCKET NO.
E-01933A-15-0322**

Direct Testimony and Exhibits of

Michael P. Gorman

On behalf of

**United States Department of Defense
and all other Federal Executive Agencies**

June 3, 2016



BEFORE THE
ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF JUST AND REASONABLE RATES
AND CHARGES DESIGNED TO
REALIZE A REASONABLE RATE OF
RETURN ON THE FAIR VALUE OF THE
PROPERTIES OF TUCSON ELECTRIC
POWER COMPANY DEVOTED TO ITS
OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE
STATE OF ARIZONA AND FOR
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BEFORE THE
ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF TUCSON ELECTRIC POWER
COMPANY FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT
OF JUST AND REASONABLE RATES
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DOCKET NO.
E-01933A-15-0322

Direct Testimony of Michael P. Gorman

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

1

2 Q PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.

3 A Michael P. Gorman. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,
4 Chesterfield, MO 63017.

5 Q WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?

6 A I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Managing Principal of
7 Brubaker & Associates, Inc., energy, economic and regulatory consultants.

8 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE.

9 A This information is included in Appendix A to my testimony.

1 **Q ON WHOSE BEHALF ARE YOU APPEARING IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

2 A I am testifying on behalf of the United States Department of Defense and all other
3 Federal Executive Agencies ("DoD/FEA"). DoD/FEA is a large customer of Tucson
4 Electric Power Company ("TEP" or "Company) and maintains military installations in
5 Arizona, including, but not limited to, Fort Huachuca and Davis-Monthan Air Force
6 Base.

7 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ISSUES YOU WILL ADDRESS IN THIS TESTIMONY.**

8 A I recommend an adjustment to TEP's proposed Required Operating Income ("ROI"),
9 which is the product of a fair rate of return and rate base. I recommend a fair ROI
10 based on an overall rate of return on original cost rate base ("ROR-OCRB") and Fair
11 Value Rate Base ("ROR-FVRB") that is fair, just and reasonable. I will also respond
12 to the Company's requested ROI and, specifically the reasonableness of TEP's
13 proposed ROR-OCRB and ROR-FVRB.

14 **I.A. Summary**

15 **Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR PROPOSED ADJUSTMENT TO TEP'S REQUESTED**
16 **ROI.**

17 A Based on my assessment of a fair ROR-OCRB and on ROR-FVRB, I recommend an
18 ROI of \$145.7 million as developed on my Exhibit MPG-1. This ROI is \$20.2 million
19 lower than TEP's requested ROI of \$165.9 million as presented on Schedule A-1. To
20 account for my recommended capital structure, I increased the Adjusted Operating
21 Income at present rates by approximately \$467 thousand due to the lowered interest
22 expense as a result of the increased debt ratio. Based on my adjustments, the

1 reduced level of operating income will lower the Company's claimed revenue
2 requirement by \$33.5 million.

3 As shown on my Exhibit MPG-1, my proposed ROI is based on an ROR-
4 OCRB of 6.74%, and an ROR-FVRB of 5.0%.

5 However, and as noted later in this testimony, and accepting the Company's
6 methodology because I understand it to be reasonably consistent with previous
7 Commission precedent in establishing a revenue requirement based on a Fair Value
8 Rate Base, this methodology includes a fair value increment to the ROR-OCRB. I
9 request the Commission to reconsider adding an increment to the fair ROR-OCRB
10 because I do not believe one is necessary to fairly compensate the Company, or to
11 ensure TEP's financial integrity and access to capital are preserved.

12 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR FINDINGS CONCERNING A FAIR ROR-OCRB.**

13 **A** I recommend an overall ROR-OCRB of 6.74%, as shown on Exhibit MPG-2. My
14 ROR-OCRB is based on a return on common equity of 9.3%, which is the midpoint of
15 my recommended range of 8.9% to 9.7%, and TEP's actual test-year-end capital
16 structure which includes a 48.69% common equity weight of total capital.

17 My recommended ROR-OCRB is sufficient to support TEP's ability to maintain
18 its financial integrity, to attract capital under reasonable terms, and is commensurate
19 with returns that investors could earn were they to invest in other enterprises of
20 comparable risk.

21 **Q DO YOU RESPOND TO TEP'S PROPOSED ROR-OCRB?**

22 **A** Yes. I will also respond to TEP witness Ms. Ann E. Bulkley's recommended ROR-
23 OCRB of 7.34%, which includes a return on common equity of 10.35%, and a capital

1 structure that contains more common equity than TEP's actual test-year-end capital
2 structure.

3 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON AN ROR-FVRB.**

4 A I have revised the Company's fair value rate of return recommendation based on my
5 ROR-OCRB, and an update to the fair value increment. These revisions to the
6 Company's proposed ROR-FVRB results in a fair ROR-FVRB of 5.0%.

7 While I update the Company's fair value rate of return estimate, I also
8 describe why I believe that the use of a fair value methodology should not produce an
9 ROI for TEP that is substantially different from the ROI measured from a fair ROR-
10 OCRB. Using a fair value and original cost methodology are two methodologies of
11 estimating a fair ROI entitlement for the utility. I do not agree with TEP's
12 characterization that the fair value methodology should be used to add an increment
13 above the ROI that represents a fair ROR-OCRB using a fair value methodology.

14 **Q WILL YOU COMMENT ON THE REASONABLENESS OF TEP'S REQUESTED**
15 **ROR-FVRB?**

16 A Yes. TEP is requesting an ROR-FVRB of 5.69%.¹ This ROR-FVRB is overstated
17 due to the use of an overstated fair return on common equity on Reconstruction Cost
18 New, Depreciated ("RCND"), and contains a fair value increment that does not
19 accurately reflect current market data indicating the current market risk-free rate. For
20 these reasons, I recommend the Company's ROR-FVRB be rejected.

¹Direct Testimony of Ann E. Bulkley at 9.

II. INVESTMENT RISK

II.A. Regulated Utility Industry Market Outlook

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CREDIT RATING OUTLOOK FOR REGULATED UTILITIES.

A Regulated utilities' credit ratings have improved over the last few years and the outlook has been labeled "Stable" by credit rating agencies. Credit analysts have also observed that utilities have strong access to capital at attractive pricing (i.e., low capital costs), which has supported very large capital programs.

Standard & Poor's ("S&P") recently published a report titled "The Outlook For U.S. Regulated Utilities Remains Stable On Increasing Capital Spending And Robust Financial Performance." (Emphasis added). In that report, S&P noted the following:

Ratings Outlook. Stable with a slight bias toward the negative. Utilities in the U.S. continue to enjoy a confluence of financial, economic, and regulatory environments that are tailor-made for supporting credit quality. Low interest rates, modest economic growth, and relatively stable commodity costs make for little pressure on rates and therefore on the sunny disposition of regulators.

- **Credit Metrics.** We see credit metrics remaining within historic norms for the industry as a whole and do not project overall financial performance that would affect the industry's creditworthiness.

- **Industry Trends.** Taking advantage of the favorable market conditions, utilities have been maintaining aggressive capital spending programs to bolster system safety and reliability, as well as technological advances to make the systems "smarter." The elevated spending has not led to large rate increases, but if macro conditions reverse and lead to rising costs that command higher rates, we would expect utilities to throttle back on spending to manage regulatory risk.²

Similarly, Fitch states:

Stable Financial Performance: The stable financial performance of Utilities, Power & Gas (UPG) issuers continues to support a sound credit profile for the sector, with 93% of the UPG portfolio carrying investment-grade ratings as of June 30, 2015, including 65% in the

²Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Corporate Industry credit Research: Industry Top Trends 2016, Utilities," December 9, 2015, at 22, emphasis added.

1 'BBB' rating category. Second-quarter 2015 LTM [Long-Term Maturity]
2 leverage metrics remained relatively unchanged year over year (YOY)
3 while interest coverage metrics modestly improved. Fitch Ratings
4 expects this trend to broadly sustain for the remainder of 2015, driven
5 by positive recurring factors.

6 **Low Debt-Funded Costs:** The sustained low interest rate
7 environment has allowed UPG companies to refinance high-coupon
8 legacy debt with lower coupon new debt. Gross interest expense on an
9 absolute value represented approximately 4.6% of total adjusted debt
10 as of June 30, 2015, a decline of about 150 bps from the 6.1%
11 recorded in the midst of the recession. Fitch believes a rise in interest
12 rates would largely be neutral to credit quality, as issuers have
13 generally built enough headroom in coverage metrics to withstand
14 higher financing costs.

15 **Capex Moderately Declining:** Fitch expects the capex/depreciation
16 ratio to be at the lower end of its five-year historical range of 2.0x–2.5x
17 in the near term, reflecting a moderate decline in projected capex from
18 the 2011–2014 highs. The capex depreciation ratio was relatively flat
19 YOY at about 2.4x. Capex targets investments toward base
20 infrastructure upgrades, utility-scale renewables and transmission
21 investments.

22 * * *

23 Key credit metrics for IUCs [investor-owned utility companies]
24 remained relatively stable YOY and continue to support the sound
25 credit profiles and Stable Outlooks characteristic of the sector.
26 EBITDAR [Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, Amortization
27 and Rent] and FFO [Funds From Operations] coverage ratios were
28 5.6x and 5.9x, respectively, for the LTM ended second-quarter 2015,
29 while adjusted debt/EDITDAR and FFO-adjusted leverage were 3.5x
30 and 3.4x, respectively.³

31 Moody's recent comments on the U.S. Utility Sector state as follows:

32 Our outlook for the US regulated utilities industry is stable. This outlook
33 reflects our expectations for fundamental business conditions in the
34 industry over the next 12 to 18 months.

35 » **The credit-supportive regulatory environment is the main**
36 **reason for our stable outlook.** We expect that the relationship
37 between regulators and utilities in 2016 will remain credit-supportive,
38 enabling utilities to recover costs in a timely manner and maintain
39 stable cash flows.

³Fitch Ratings: "U.S. Utilities, Power & Gas Data comparator," September 21, 2015, at 1 and 7, emphasis added.

1 » We estimate that the ratio of cash flow from operations (CFO) to
2 debt will hold steady at about 21%, on average for the industry,
3 over the next 12 to 18 months. The use of timely cost-recovery
4 mechanisms and continued expense management will help utilities
5 offset a lack of growth in electricity demand and lower allowed returns
6 on equity, enabling financial metrics to remain stable. Tax benefits tied
7 to the expected extension of bonus depreciation will also support CFO-
8 to-debt ratios.


9 * * *

10 » Utilities are increasingly using holding company leverage to
11 drive returns, a credit negative. Although not a driver of our outlook,
12 utilities are using leverage at the holding company level to invest in
13 other businesses, make acquisitions and earn higher returns on equity,
14 which could have negative implications across the whole family.⁴

15 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE UTILITY STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE OVER THE LAST
16 SEVERAL YEARS.

17 A As shown in the graph below, SNL Financial has recorded utility stock price
18 performance compared to the market. The industry's stock performance data from
19 2004 through March 2016 shows that the SNL Electric Company Index has
20 outperformed the market in downturns and trailed the market during recovery. This
21 relatively stable price performance for utilities supports my conclusion that utility stock
22 investments are regarded by market participants as a moderate- to low-risk
23 investment.

⁴Moody's Investors Service: "2016 Outlook – US Regulated Utilities: Credit-Supportive Regulatory Environment Drives Stable Outlook," November 6, 2015, at 1, emphasis added.



Q HAVE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY TRADE ORGANIZATIONS COMMENTED ON ELECTRIC UTILITY STOCK PRICE PERFORMANCE?

A Yes. In its 4th Quarter 2015 Financial Update, The Edison Electric Institute ("EEI") stated the following concerning the EEI Electric Utility Stock Index ("EEI Index"):

EEI Index returns during 2015 embodied the larger pattern seen in Table I since the 2008/2009 financial crisis, as industry business models have migrated to an increasingly regulated emphasis. The industry has generated consistent positive returns but has lagged the broader markets when markets post strong gains, which in turn have been sparked both by slow but steady U.S. economic growth and corporate profit gains and by the willingness of the Federal Reserve to bolster markets with historically unprecedented monetary support in the form of three rounds of quantitative easing and near-zero short-term interest rates. While the Fed did raise short-term rates in December 2015 for the first time since 2006 (from zero to a range of 0.25% to 0.50%), this hardly effects longer-term yields, which remain at historically low levels and are influenced more by the level of inflation and economic strength than by the Fed's short-term rate policy.

* * *

Regulated Fundamentals Remain Stable

The rate stability offered by state regulation and the ability to recover rising capital spending in rate base shield regulated utilities from the

1 volatility in the competitive power arena and turn the growth of
2 renewable generation (and the resulting need for new and upgraded
3 transmission lines) into a rate base growth opportunity for many
4 industry players.

5 * * *

6 In the shorter-term, analysts continue to see opportunity for 4-6%
7 earnings growth for regulated utilities in general along with prospects
8 for slightly rising dividends (with a dividend yield now at about 4% for
9 the industry overall). That formula has served utility investors quite
10 well in recent years, delivering long-term returns equivalent to those of
11 the broad markets but with much lower volatility. Provided state
12 regulation remains fair and constructive in an effort to address the
13 interests of ratepayers and investors, it would appear that the industry
14 can continue to deliver success for all stakeholders, even in an
15 environment of flat demand and considerable technological change.⁵

16 **Q WHAT ARE THE IMPORTANT TAKEAWAY POINTS FROM THIS ASSESSMENT**
17 **OF UTILITY INDUSTRY CREDIT AND INVESTMENT RISK OUTLOOKS?**

18 **A** Credit rating agencies consider the regulated utility industry to be Stable and believe
19 investors will continue to provide an abundance of low-cost capital to support utilities'
20 large capital programs at attractive costs and terms. All of this reinforces my belief
21 that utility investments are generally regarded as safe-haven or low-risk investments,
22 and the market continues to embrace and demand low-risk investments such as utility
23 securities. The ongoing demand for low-risk investments can reasonably be
24 expected to continue to provide attractive low-cost capital for regulated utilities.

⁵EEI Q4 2015 Financial Update: "Stock Performance" at 4 and 6, emphasis added.

II.B. TEP Investment Risk

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MARKET'S ASSESSMENT OF THE INVESTMENT RISK OF TEP.

A The market's assessment of TEP's investment risk is described by credit rating analysts' reports. TEP's current corporate bond ratings from S&P and Moody's are BBB+ and A3, respectively. Recently, S&P revised TEP's outlook from "Stable" to "Negative," which reflects TEP's ultimate parent's decision to acquire ITC Holdings, Inc. and finance the transaction primarily with debt. Specifically, S&P states:

Rating Action

On Feb. 10, 2016, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed its ratings on Tucson Electric Power Co. (TEP), including the 'BBB+' issuer credit rating and 'BBB+' senior unsecured debt rating, and revised the outlook to negative from stable.

Rationale

The negative outlook reflects Fortis' agreement to acquire ITC Holdings Corp. and that Fortis' consolidated financial measures could consistently weaken from current levels, reflecting funds from operations (FFO)-to-debt of below 10%.

We base our 'BBB+' issuer credit rating on TEP on our assessments of its strong business risk profile and significant financial risk profile.

TEP's strong business risk profile reflects its lower-risk regulated electric utility operation, offset by its highly volatile profitability compared with the regulated utility industry average. TEP serves more than 415,000 customers in southeastern Arizona and about 75% of its electricity comes from burning coal. TEP accounts for about 80% of parent UNS Energy Corp. based on our forward view of earnings, revenues, and assets. UNS's other businesses include regulated UNS Electric Inc. and UNS Gas Inc. that serve about 250,000 customers.

Although we have historically viewed regulation in Arizona as challenging, recent regulatory outcomes have been more supportive, such as the approval of partial decoupling, higher fixed cost recovery, an environmental compliance adjustor, and forward-looking pass-through adjustment clauses for items such as purchased power and fuel.

* * *

We assess TEP's financial risk profile as significant, using our medial volatility table. The use of that table reflects the company's lower-risk regulated utility business model that is offset by the higher operating risk of regulated generation.

Under our base-case scenario, we expect that TEP's core stand-alone financial measures will continue to remain in the middle of the range for the significant financial risk profile category. Our key assumptions include modest sales growth despite rising energy efficiency and distributed generation, higher capital spending for new generation, and necessary capital spending to meet environmental and renewable standards. Specifically, we expect FFO to debt of about 17%.

* * *

Outlook

The negative outlook reflects the possibility that we could downgrade Fortis by up to one notch on the ITC acquisition. This reflects execution and integration risks, as well as the probability that consolidated financial measures could weaken because of increased consolidated debt from the acquisition's financing.⁶

Similarly, Fitch states the following:

Key Rating Drivers

Acquisition by Fortis: In the third quarter of 2014 Fortis Inc., Canada's largest investor-owned gas and electric distribution utility, acquired UNS Energy Corp. (UNS), the ultimate parent company of Tucson Electric Power Co. (TEP) for approximately \$4.5 billion, including the assumption of approximately \$2 billion of debt. TEP's ratings reflect the utility's improved access to capital due to Fortis' financial strength and the expectation that Fortis will support TEP's growth objectives and provide appropriate financing support as needed.

Solid Credit Metrics: For the LTM period ending March 31, 2015, TEP's EBITDAR coverage ratio trended flat at 5.3x as compared with 5.2x for 2014. Debt/EBITDAR leverage approximated 4.4x for the same period. Going forward, EBITDAR coverage is expected to approximate over 5x through 2018, and leverage, as measured by debt/EBITDAR is expected to improve to less than 4x over the same period due to a combination of new rates, amortizing capital lease obligations, and improving economic conditions in TEP's service territory.

⁶Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Research Update: Tucson Electric Power Co. Outlook Revised To Negative, Ratings Affirmed On Parent's Planned Acquisition," February 10, 2016, at 2-4, emphasis added.

Fortis Financial Support; New Generation: In the fourth quarter of 2014 Fortis injected \$225 million of equity into TEP to strengthen its balance sheet and to help fund the purchase of a 75% ownership interest in Unit 3 at the 550 MW natural gas-fired Gila River power plant for \$164 million and to increase TEP's ownership stake in the 387 MW coal-fired Springerville Unit 1 power plant to 49.5% for \$65 million. The acquisition is consistent with TEP's strategy to diversify its generation fuel mix and to shift towards cleaner generation resources.

Dividend Restriction: Per the terms of the merger, dividends to UNS from its regulated utilities cannot exceed 60% of annual net income for a period of five years or until their respective equity/total capitalization ratios reach 50%.

Constructive GRC Settlement; Filing Expected: TEP's last rate order, which reflects a 10% return on equity, continues the trend of constructive regulatory outcomes by the Arizona Corporation Commission (ACC). Fitch Ratings expects the regulatory environment in Arizona to remain constructive and expects TEP to file its next general rate case (GRC) in the fourth quarter of 2015.

Increased Capex Needs: TEP plans to spend \$1.3 billion on capex through 2018, including \$508 million this year, levels 10% higher than the preceding four-year period. The majority of capex is covered by operating cash flows, and Fitch projects TEP to be modestly FCF-negative through 2018 and expects future funding needs to be met by a balanced mix of debt and equity.⁷

III. ORIGINAL COST RATE OF RETURN

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THIS SECTION OF YOUR TESTIMONY.

A In this section I will estimate a rate of return for TEP's original cost rate base. I will develop my recommended overall rate of return by developing a reasonable capital structure used for ratemaking purposes, recommend an embedded cost of debt component, and measure a fair rate of return on common equity for TEP in this proceeding. My fair return on common equity will also consider the financial integrity implications of my original cost rate of return recommendation.

⁷Fitch Ratings: *U.S. Integrated Electric Utilities Handbook: A Detailed Review of Integrated Electric Utilities*, "Corporates: Tucson Electric Power Co.," August 3, 2015, at 343.

1 **III.A. TEP's Proposed Capital Structure**

2 **Q WHAT IS TEP'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE?**

3 **A** TEP's proposed test-year-end capital structure is shown in Table 1 below:

TABLE 1	
<u>TEP's Proposed Capital Structure</u> (Proposed End-of-Test-Year Period)	
<u>Description</u>	<u>Weight</u>
Long-Term Debt	49.97%
Common Equity	50.03%
Total Regulatory Capital Structure	100.00%
Sources: Direct Testimony of Kentton C. Grant at 12, and Schedule D-1, page 1.	

4 **Q IS TEP'S PROPOSED CAPITAL STRUCTURE REASONABLE?**

5 **A** No. TEP's proposed end-of-test-year capital structure does not reflect its actual
6 capital structure at the end-of-test-year period. As discussed by Mr. Kentton C. Grant
7 at page 11 of his direct testimony, the Company's actual end-of-test-year period
8 capital structure is shown below in Table 2.

TABLE 2

TEP's Capital Structure
(Actual End-of-Test-Year Period)
(June 30, 2015)

<u>Description</u>	<u>Weight</u>
Long-Term Debt	51.31%
Common Equity	<u>48.69%</u>
Total Regulatory Capital Structure	100.00%

Sources: Direct Testimony of Kentton C. Grant at 11, and
Schedule D-1, page 1.

1 Q DO YOU BELIEVE IT IS REASONABLE FOR MR. GRANT TO ASK FOR A
2 CAPITAL STRUCTURE THAT IS DIFFERENT THAN TEP'S ACTUAL END-OF-
3 TEST-YEAR CAPITAL STRUCTURE?

4 A No. Mr. Grant asserts that the Company is working toward an approximate 50%
5 common equity ratio of its total capital. However, in this test period its actual capital
6 structure indicates that its common equity ratio is short of that goal, or 48.69%. This
7 capital structure is reasonable, and is supportive of TEP's bond rating, including the
8 improvement in its bond rating noted by TEP that took place in 2014. Unnecessarily
9 adjusting TEP's actual capital structure will inflate its claimed revenue deficiency in
10 this proceeding, without justification.

11 Q WHY WOULD AN INCREASE IN TEP'S CAPITAL STRUCTURE COMMON
12 EQUITY RATIO INFLATE ITS REVENUE DEFICIENCY?

13 A Unnecessarily increasing the common equity ratio of TEP's actual capital structure
14 will increase its revenue requirement because a larger percentage of common equity

1 will increase the overall rate of return and related income tax expense. This occurs
2 because common equity is the most expensive form of capital and, unlike debt, is
3 subject to income tax expense.

4 The revenue requirement cost of a 10% return on equity is approximately
5 16%, after reflecting a gross-up for income tax. The revenue requirement cost of
6 debt to TEP is approximately 4.5% – marginal debt cost without a tax gross-up.
7 Hence, common equity cost is currently about four times more expensive than the
8 cost of debt.

9 **III.B. Embedded Cost of Debt**

10 **Q WHAT IS THE EMBEDDED COST OF DEBT THAT THE COMPANY IS**
11 **PROPOSING IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

12 **A** The Company is proposing an embedded debt cost of 4.32%. The embedded debt
13 cost, as developed on TEP Schedule D-2, is sponsored by Company witness
14 Mr. Grant. Mr. Grant's estimated cost of debt of 4.32% is an increase to the end-of-
15 test-period cost of debt of 4.14%. Mr. Grant adjusted TEP's debt cost by reflecting a
16 planned retirement in August 2015 of two 1982 variable rate bond series.

17 I accept Mr. Grant's adjusted cost of debt because these retiring variable rate
18 bonds likely can be financed at market interest rates that are at or below the
19 estimated adjusted embedded cost of debt proposed by Mr. Grant of 4.32%.
20 Therefore, I will accept TEP's proposed 4.32% cost of debt as a reasonable estimate
21 of the cost of debt based on end of period actual long-term debt balances of
22 \$1,521 million, after maturing variable rate debt is refinanced.

1 **III.C Return on Equity**

2 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHAT IS MEANT BY A "UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON**
3 **EQUITY."**

4 **A** A utility's cost of common equity is the expected return that investors require on an
5 investment in the utility. Investors expect to earn their required return from receiving
6 dividends and through stock price appreciation.

7 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE FRAMEWORK FOR DETERMINING A REGULATED**
8 **UTILITY'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY.**

9 **A** In general, determining a fair cost of common equity for a regulated utility has been
10 framed by two hallmark decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court: Bluefield Water Works
11 & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of W. Va., 262 U.S. 679 (1923) and Fed.
12 Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).

13 These decisions identify the general financial and economic standards to be
14 considered in establishing the cost of common equity for a public utility. Those
15 general standards provide that the authorized return should: (1) be sufficient to
16 maintain financial integrity; (2) attract capital under reasonable terms; and (3) be
17 commensurate with returns investors could earn by investing in other enterprises of
18 comparable risk.

19 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE METHODS YOU HAVE USED TO ESTIMATE TEP'S**
20 **COST OF COMMON EQUITY.**

21 **A** I have used several models based on financial theory to estimate TEP's cost of
22 common equity. These models are: (1) a constant growth Discounted Cash Flow
23 ("DCF") model using consensus analysts' growth rate projections; (2) a constant

1 growth DCF using sustainable growth rate estimates; (3) a multi-stage growth DCF
2 model; (4) a Risk Premium model; and (5) a Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"). I
3 have applied these models to a group of publicly traded utilities that have investment
4 risk similar to TEP.

5 **III.D. Risk Proxy Group**

6 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU IDENTIFIED A PROXY UTILITY GROUP THAT**
7 **COULD BE USED TO REASONABLY REFLECT THE INVESTMENT RISK OF TEP**
8 **AND USED TO ESTIMATE ITS CURRENT MARKET COST OF EQUITY.**

9 **A** I first reviewed the proxy group selection criteria used by TEP witness Ms. Bulkley.
10 However, I am not relying on Ms. Bulkley's proxy group for several reasons. First, I
11 could not confirm that Ms. Bulkley's proxy group complied with her own proxy group
12 selection criteria. Specifically, Ms. Bulkley stated that she only included companies
13 who had 90% of their operating income from regulated electric operations. However,
14 after a detailed review of her workpapers, I could not find a workpaper that confirmed
15 that each of her proxy group selected companies met this proxy group selection
16 criterion. Further, I am concerned about relying on an operating income selection
17 criterion from a single year because operating income can vary based on non-
18 recurring and/or abnormal events in any given year. As such, this operating income
19 screen could be skewed if it is not based on normal operating conditions. While I
20 could not confirm Ms. Bulkley's findings on this, I do note that her workpapers
21 included SEC Form 10-Ks for her proxy group, which do provide the information to
22 make this calculation. However, those SEC documents do not allow for a
23 normalization of the operating income characteristics of each proxy company.

1 Further, a review of many of the companies included in Ms. Bulkley's proxy
2 group, shows that many of them would not continue to meet her selection criteria in
3 an updated analysis. Specifically, in an updated analysis, Duke Energy, and Empire
4 District Electric Company would not have been in compliance with Ms. Bulkley's
5 merger and acquisition criterion. As such, Ms. Bulkley's proxy group would have
6 been reduced from 12 companies down to only 10.

7 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU DEVELOPED YOUR PROPOSED PROXY**
8 **GROUP.**

9 **A** I started with the *Value Line* Electric Utility Industry and excluded the companies that
10 did not meet the following screening criteria:

- 11 • Have investment grade credit rating from S&P and Moody's.
- 12 • Have consistently paid dividends over the last two years.
- 13 • Have positive consensus analysts' growth rates from at least one of my sources:
14 Zacks, SNL Financial, and Reuters.
- 15 • Have not been involved in recent merger and acquisition ("M&A") transactions or
16 bankruptcy proceedings.
- 17 • Are classified as Regulated (80%+ of total assets are regulated) or Mostly
18 Regulated (50%-80%) by the Edison Electric Institute ("EEI").

19 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THIS PROXY GROUP SELECTION**
20 **PROCESS.**

21 **A** The following companies were eliminated from the *Value Line* Electric Utility Industry,
22 which based on these selection criteria:

- 23 1. MGE Energy was eliminated because it does not have an investment grade bond
24 rating from S&P and Moody's. MGE Energy does not have a bond rating, unlike
25 its utility subsidiary. The publicly traded utility company thus fails this selection
26 criterion.

1 2. Otter Tail Power was eliminated because it does not have a positive analysts'
2 growth rate from Zacks, SNL Financial or Reuters.

3 3. Many companies have been involved in M&A activities more recently, which
4 resulted in removal of the following companies:

- 5 • Black Hills is acquiring SourceGas.
- 6 • Dominion is acquiring Questar Corp.
- 7 • Duke Energy is acquiring Piedmont Natural Gas.
- 8 • Empire is being acquired by Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp.
- 9 • Exelon Corp is merging with Pepco Inc.
- 10 • NextEra Energy is acquiring Hawaiian Electric.
- 11 • Fortis, Inc. is acquiring ITC Holdings, Inc.
- 12 • Southern Company is acquiring AGL Resources.
- 13 • TECO Energy is being acquired by Emera, Inc.

14 Based on this process, my proxy group consists of approximately
15 29 companies, as shown on my Exhibit MPG-3.

16 **Q WHY IS IT APPROPRIATE TO REMOVE COMPANIES THAT DO NOT HAVE**
17 **INVESTMENT GRADE BOND RATINGS FROM S&P AND MOODY'S?**

18 **A** The proxy group should contain companies that have reasonable risk characteristics
19 to that of TEP. TEP currently has investment grade bond ratings of BBB+ and A3
20 from S&P and Moody's, respectively. Selecting proxy group companies that have
21 comparable credit ratings as TEP is an important and verifiable risk selection
22 criterion.

1 **Q WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SELECT PROXY GROUP COMPANIES THAT HAVE**
2 **PAID DIVIDENDS OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS?**

3 A Utility companies generally are regarded as income investments by the investment
4 community. The ability to pay dividends in a predictable manner is an important risk
5 assessment for an electric utility investment. Companies that have suspended or
6 reduced dividends have generally gone through financial difficulty. The past financial
7 difficulty may still impact the market valuation of the company's securities and/or
8 credit rating. Therefore, it is important to eliminate companies that have reduced or
9 eliminated dividends because the market valuation may be skewed, which can distort
10 the estimate of the current market cost of equity. Please note, that TEP witness
11 Ms. Bulkley also used dividend payment as a proxy group selection criterion.⁸

12 **Q WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO LIMIT THE PROXY GROUP COMPANIES TO THOSE**
13 **THAT HAVE CONSENSUS ANALYSTS' GROWTH RATES PUBLISHED BY**
14 **ZACKS, SNL FINANCIAL OR REUTERS?**

15 A Selecting companies that have consensus analysts' growth rate projections from at
16 least one of these three sources is an indication that market participants are following
17 the security, and there is adequate liquidity and market demand for the security to
18 support the assumption that the market valuation of the security is based on
19 fundamental valuation principles. A stock that is thinly traded, or is not widely
20 followed by the market, may have an observable market price which is inconsistent
21 with fundamental valuation principles.

⁸Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley at 20.

1 Q WHY IS IT APPROPRIATE TO EXCLUDE COMPANIES WHICH ARE INVOLVED
2 IN M&A ACTIVITY FROM THE PROXY GROUP?

3 A M&A activity can distort the market factors used in DCF and risk premium studies.
4 M&A activity can have impacts on stock prices, growth outlooks, and relative volatility
5 in historical stock prices if the market was anticipating or expecting the M&A activity
6 prior to it actually being announced. This distortion in the market data thus impacts
7 the reliability of the DCF and risk premium estimates for a company involved in M&A.

8 Moreover, Companies generally enter into M&A in order to produce greater
9 shareholder value by combining companies. The enhanced shareholder value
10 normally could not be realized had the two companies not combined.

11 When companies announce an M&A, the public assesses the proposed
12 merger and develops outlooks on the value of the two companies after the
13 combination based on expected synergies or other value adds created by the M&A.

14 As a result, the stock value before the merger is completed may not reflect the
15 forward-looking earnings and dividend payments for the company absent the merger
16 or on a stand-alone basis. Therefore, an accurate DCF return estimate on
17 companies involved in M&A activities cannot be produced because their stock prices
18 do not reflect the stand-alone investment characteristics of the companies. Rather,
19 the stock price more likely reflects the shareholder enhancement produced by the
20 proposed transaction. For these reasons, it is appropriate to remove companies
21 involved in M&A activity from a proxy group used to estimate a fair return on equity for
22 a utility.

1 **Q WHY IS IMPORTANT TO LIMIT COMPANIES INCLUDED IN YOUR PROXY**
2 **GROUP TO THOSE WHICH HAVE BEEN CLASSIFIED BY EEI AS EITHER**
3 **REGULATED OR MOSTLY REGULATED?**

4 **A EEI provides financial data to market participants which can be used to identify**
5 **companies that are predominantly regulated utility companies. EEI classifies**
6 **companies as Regulated if at least 80% of their assets are regarded as regulated**
7 **utility operations. Mostly Regulated companies include publicly traded companies**
8 **that have 50% to 80% of their assets dedicated to regulated utility operations.**
9 **Hence, this selection criterion uses available market data to identify companies which**
10 **are regarded as primarily regulated electric utilities.**

11 This selection criterion identifies companies that are generally in the same
12 industry as TEP, and therefore are appropriate for inclusion in a regulated utility proxy
13 group. The industry is significant because utility companies are generally regarded
14 as low-risk stable investments. This selection criterion is similar to Ms. Bulkley's use
15 of a regulated operating income to total company operating income as a proxy group
16 selection criterion. However, Ms. Bulkley's criterion can be impacted by abnormal or
17 non-recurring impacts on annual operating income. Therefore, I believe the EEI
18 selection criterion screen is a more reliable gauge to select companies that are
19 predominantly regulated utilities.

20 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE WHY YOU BELIEVE YOUR PROXY GROUP IS**
21 **REASONABLY COMPARABLE IN INVESTMENT RISK TO TEP.**

22 **A The proxy group is shown in Exhibit MPG-3. The proxy group has an average**
23 **corporate credit rating from S&P of BBB+, which is identical to S&P's corporate credit**
24 **rating for TEP. The proxy group has an average corporate credit rating from Moody's**

of Baa1, which is one notch lower than TEP's corporate credit rating from Moody's of A3. Based on this information, I believe my proxy group is reasonably comparable in investment risk to TEP.

The proxy group has an average common equity ratio of 45.6% (including short-term debt) from SNL Financial ("SNL") and 47.9% (excluding short-term debt) from *The Value Line Investment Survey* ("Value Line") in 2015.

My recommended 48.7% common equity ratio is slightly higher but comparable to the proxy group. Based on these risk factors, I conclude the proxy group reasonably approximates the investment risk of TEP.

III.E. Discounted Cash Flow Model

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE DCF MODEL.

A The DCF model posits that a stock price is valued by summing the present value of expected future cash flows discounted at the investor's required rate of return or cost of capital. This model is expressed mathematically as follows:

$$P_0 = \frac{D_1}{(1+K)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+K)^2} + \dots + \frac{D_\infty}{(1+K)^\infty} \quad (\text{Equation 1})$$

P_0 = Current stock price

D = Dividends in periods 1 - ∞

K = Investor's required return

This model can be rearranged in order to estimate the discount rate or investor-required return, "K." If it is reasonable to assume that earnings and dividends will grow at a constant rate, then Equation 1 can be rearranged as follows:

1 $K = D_1/P_0 + G$ (Equation 2)

2 K = Investor's required return

3 D_1 = Dividend in first year

4 P_0 = Current stock price

5 G = Expected constant dividend growth rate

6 Equation 2 is referred to as the annual "constant growth" DCF model.

7 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

8 **A** As shown in Equation 2 above, the DCF model requires a current stock price,
9 expected dividend, and expected growth rate in dividends.

10 **Q WHAT STOCK PRICE HAVE YOU RELIED ON IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH**
11 **DCF MODEL?**

12 **A** I relied on the average of the weekly high and low stock prices of the utilities in the
13 proxy group over a 13-week period ending on May 13, 2016. An average stock price
14 is less susceptible to market price variations than a spot price. Therefore, an average
15 stock price is less susceptible to aberrant market price movements, which may not
16 reflect the stock's long-term value.

17 A 13-week average stock price reflects a period that is still short enough to
18 contain data that reasonably reflects current market expectations, but the period is
19 not so short as to be susceptible to market price variations that may not reflect the
20 stock's long-term value. In my judgment, a 13-week average stock price is a
21 reasonable balance between the need to reflect current market expectations and the
22 need to capture sufficient data to smooth out aberrant market movements.

1 Q WHAT DIVIDEND DID YOU USE IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?

2 A I used the most recently paid quarterly dividend, as reported in *Value Line*.⁹ This
3 dividend was annualized (multiplied by 4) and adjusted for next year's growth to
4 produce the D_1 factor for use in Equation 2 above.

5 Q WHAT DIVIDEND GROWTH RATES HAVE YOU USED IN YOUR CONSTANT
6 GROWTH DCF MODEL?

7 A There are several methods that can be used to estimate the expected growth in
8 dividends. However, regardless of the method, for purposes of determining the
9 market-required return on common equity, one must attempt to estimate investors'
10 consensus about what the dividend or earnings growth rate will be, and not what an
11 individual investor or analyst may use to make individual investment decisions.

12 As predictors of future returns, security analysts' growth estimates have been
13 shown to be more accurate than growth rates derived from historical data.¹⁰ That is,
14 assuming the market generally makes rational investment decisions, analysts' growth
15 projections are more likely to influence investors' decisions which are captured in
16 observable stock prices than growth rates derived only from historical data.

17 For my constant growth DCF analysis, I have relied on a consensus, or mean,
18 of professional security analysts' earnings growth estimates as a proxy for investor
19 consensus dividend growth rate expectations. I used the average of analysts' growth
20 rate estimates from three sources: Zacks, SNL, and Reuters. All such projections
21 were available on May 13, 2016, and all were reported online.

22 Each consensus growth rate projection is based on a survey of security
23 analysts. There is no clear evidence whether a particular analyst is most influential

⁹The *Value Line Investment Survey*, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

¹⁰See, e.g., David Gordon, Myron Gordon, and Lawrence Gould, "Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield," *The Journal of Portfolio Management*, Spring 1989.

1 on general market investors. Therefore, a single analyst's projection does not as
2 reliably predict consensus investor outlooks as does a consensus of market analysts'
3 projections. The consensus estimate is a simple arithmetic average, or mean, of
4 surveyed analysts' earnings growth forecasts. A simple average of the growth
5 forecasts gives equal weight to all surveyed analysts' projections. Therefore, a
6 simple average, or arithmetic mean, of analyst forecasts is a good proxy for market
7 consensus expectations.

8 **Q WHAT ARE THE GROWTH RATES YOU USED IN YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH**
9 **DCF MODEL?**

10 A The growth rates I used in my DCF analysis are shown in Exhibit MPG-4. The
11 average growth rate for my proxy group is 5.09%.

12 **Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT GROWTH DCF MODEL?**

13 A As shown in Exhibit MPG-5, the average and median constant growth DCF returns for
14 my proxy group for the 13-week analysis are 8.71% and 8.70%, respectively.

15 **Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR CONSTANT**
16 **GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?**

17 A Yes. The constant growth DCF analysis for my proxy group is based on a group
18 average long-term sustainable growth rate of 5.1%. The three- to five-year growth
19 rates are higher than my estimate of a maximum long-term sustainable growth rate of
20 4.2%, which I discuss later in this testimony. I believe the constant growth DCF
21 analysis produces a reasonable high-end return estimate.

1 **Q HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE A MAXIMUM LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE GROWTH**
2 **RATE?**

3 A A long-term sustainable growth rate for a utility stock cannot exceed the growth rate
4 of the economy in which it sells its goods and services. Hence, the long-term
5 maximum sustainable growth rate for a utility investment is best proxied by the
6 projected long-term Gross Domestic Product ("GDP"). *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*
7 projects that over the next 5 and 10 years, the U.S. nominal GDP will grow
8 approximately 4.2%. These GDP growth projections reflect a real growth outlook of
9 around 2.1% and an inflation outlook of around 2.1% going forward. As such, the
10 average growth rate over the next 10 years is around 4.2%, which I believe is a
11 reasonable proxy of long-term sustainable growth.¹¹

12 In my multi-stage growth DCF analysis, I discuss academic and investment
13 practitioner support for using the projected long-term GDP growth outlook as a
14 maximum sustainable growth rate projection. Hence, recognizing the long-term GDP
15 growth rate as a maximum sustainable growth is logical, and is generally consistent
16 with academic and economic practitioner accepted practices.

17 **III.F. Sustainable Growth DCF**

18 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE HOW YOU ESTIMATED A SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM**
19 **GROWTH RATE FOR YOUR SUSTAINABLE GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

20 A A sustainable growth rate is based on the percentage of the utility's earnings that is
21 retained and reinvested in utility plant and equipment. These reinvested earnings
22 increase the earnings base (rate base). Earnings grow when plant funded by

¹¹*Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, March 1, 2016, at 14.

1 reinvested earnings is put into service, and the utility is allowed to earn its authorized
2 return on such additional rate base investment.

3 The internal growth methodology is tied to the percentage of earnings retained
4 in the company and not paid out as dividends. The earnings retention ratio is 1 minus
5 the dividend payout ratio. As the payout ratio declines, the earnings retention ratio
6 increases. An increased earnings retention ratio will fuel stronger growth because
7 the business funds more investments with retained earnings.

8 The payout ratios of the proxy group are shown in my Exhibit MPG-6. These
9 dividend payout ratios and earnings retention ratios then can be used to develop a
10 sustainable long-term earnings retention growth rate. A sustainable long-term
11 earnings retention ratio will help gauge whether analysts' current three- to five-year
12 growth rate projections can be sustained over an indefinite period of time.

13 The data used to estimate the long-term sustainable growth rate is based on
14 the Company's current market-to-book ratio and on *Value Line's* three- to five-year
15 projections of earnings, dividends, earned returns on book equity, and stock
16 issuances.

17 As shown in Exhibit MPG-7, the average sustainable growth rate for the proxy
18 group using this internal growth rate model is 4.46%.

19 **Q WHAT IS THE DCF ESTIMATE USING THESE SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM**
20 **GROWTH RATES?**

21 **A** A DCF estimate based on these sustainable growth rates is developed in Exhibit
22 MPG-8. As shown there, a sustainable growth DCF analysis produces proxy group
23 average and median DCF results for the 13-week period of 8.06% and 7.72%,
24 respectively.

III.G. Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model

Q HAVE YOU CONDUCTED ANY OTHER DCF STUDIES?

A Yes. My first constant growth DCF is based on consensus analysts' growth rate projections, so it is a reasonable reflection of rational investment expectations over the next three to five years. The limitation on this constant growth DCF model is that it cannot reflect a rational expectation that a period of high/low short-term growth can be followed by a change in growth to a rate that is more reflective of long-term sustainable growth. Hence, I performed a multi-stage growth DCF analysis to reflect this outlook of changing growth expectations.

Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE GROWTH RATES CAN CHANGE OVER TIME?

A Analyst-projected growth rates over the next three to five years will change as utility earnings growth outlooks change. Utility companies go through cycles in making investments in their systems. When utility companies are making large investments, their rate base grows rapidly, which in turn accelerates earnings growth. Once a major construction cycle is completed or levels off, growth in the utility rate base slows, and its earnings growth slows from an abnormally high three- to five-year rate to a lower sustainable growth rate.

As major construction cycles extend over longer periods of time, even with an accelerated construction program, the growth rate of the utility will slow simply because rate base growth will slow, and the utility has limited human and capital resources available to expand its construction program. Therefore, the three- to five-year growth rate projection should be used as a long-term sustainable growth rate but not without making a reasonable informed judgment to determine whether it

1 considers the current market environment, the industry, and whether the three- to
2 five-year growth outlook is sustainable.

3 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF MODEL.**

4 A The multi-stage growth DCF model reflects the possibility of non-constant growth for
5 a company over time. The multi-stage growth DCF model reflects three growth
6 periods: (1) a short-term growth period, which consists of the first five years; (2) a
7 transition period, which consists of the next five years (6 through 10); and (3) a
8 long-term growth period, starting in year 11 through perpetuity.

9 For the short-term growth period, I relied on the consensus analysts' growth
10 projections described above in relationship to my constant growth DCF model. For
11 the transition period, the growth rates were reduced or increased by an equal factor,
12 which reflects the difference between the analysts' growth rates and the long-term
13 sustainable growth rate. For the long-term growth period, I assumed each company's
14 growth would converge to the maximum sustainable long-term growth rate.

15 **Q WHY IS THE GDP GROWTH PROJECTION A REASONABLE PROXY FOR THE**
16 **MAXIMUM SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE?**

17 A Utilities cannot indefinitely sustain a growth rate that exceeds the growth rate of the
18 economy in which they sell services. Utilities' earnings/dividend growth is created by
19 increased utility investment or rate base. Such investment, in turn, is driven by
20 service area economic growth and demand for utility service. In other words, utilities
21 invest in plant to meet sales demand growth, and sales growth, in turn, is tied to
22 economic growth in their service areas.

1 Q IS THERE RESEARCH THAT SUPPORTS YOUR POSITION THAT, OVER THE
2 LONG TERM, A COMPANY'S EARNINGS AND DIVIDENDS CANNOT GROW AT
3 A RATE GREATER THAN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?

4 A Yes. This concept is supported in published analyst literature and academic work.
5 Specifically, in a textbook titled "Fundamentals of Financial Management," published
6 by Eugene Brigham and Joel F. Houston, the authors state as follows:

7 The constant growth model is most appropriate for mature companies
8 with a stable history of growth and stable future expectations.
9 Expected growth rates vary somewhat among companies, but
10 dividends for mature firms are often expected to grow in the future at
11 about the same rate as nominal gross domestic product (real GDP
12 plus inflation).¹²

13 The use of the economic growth rate is also supported by investment
14 practitioners as outlined as follows:

15 **Estimating Growth Rates**

16 One of the advantages of a three-stage discounted cash flow model is
17 that it fits with life cycle theories in regards to company growth. In
18 these theories, companies are assumed to have a life cycle with
19 varying growth characteristics. Typically, the potential for extraordinary
20 growth in the near term eases over time and eventually growth slows
21 to a more stable level.

22 * * *

23 Another approach to estimating long-term growth rates is to focus on
24 estimating the overall economic growth rate. Again, this is the
25 approach used in the *Ibbotson Cost of Capital Yearbook*. To obtain
26 the economic growth rate, a forecast is made of the growth rate's
27 component parts. Expected growth can be broken into two main parts:
28 expected inflation and expected real growth. By analyzing these
29 components separately, it is easier to see the factors that drive
30 growth.¹³

¹²"Fundamentals of Financial Management," Eugene F. Brigham and Joel F. Houston, Eleventh Edition 2007, Thomson South-Western, a Division of Thomson Corporation at 298, emphasis added.

¹³Morningstar, Inc., *Ibbotson SBBI 2013 Valuation Yearbook* at 51 and 52.

1 **Q IS THERE ANY ACTUAL INVESTMENT HISTORY THAT SUPPORTS THE**
2 **NOTION THAT THE CAPITAL APPRECIATION FOR STOCK INVESTMENTS WILL**
3 **NOT EXCEED THE NOMINAL GROWTH OF THE U.S. GDP?**

4 **A Yes. This is evident by a comparison of the compound annual growth of the U.S.**
5 **GDP compared to the geometric growth of the U.S. stock market. Morningstar**
6 **measures the historical geometric growth of the U.S. stock market over the period**
7 **1926-2014 to be approximately 5.9%. During this same time period, the U.S. nominal**
8 **compound annual growth of the U.S. GDP was approximately 6.2%.¹⁴**

9 As such, the compound geometric growth of the U.S. nominal GDP has been
10 higher but comparable to the nominal growth of the U.S. stock market capital
11 appreciation. This historical relationship indicates the U.S. GDP growth outlook is a
12 conservative estimate of the long-term sustainable growth of U.S. stock investments.

13 **Q HOW DID YOU DETERMINE A SUSTAINABLE LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE**
14 **THAT REFLECTS THE CURRENT CONSENSUS OUTLOOK OF THE MARKET?**

15 **A I relied on the consensus analysts' projections of long-term GDP growth. *Blue Chip***
16 ***Economic Indicators* publishes consensus economists' GDP growth projections twice**
17 **a year. These consensus analysts' GDP growth outlooks are the best available**
18 **measure of the market's assessment of long-term GDP growth. These analyst**
19 **projections reflect all current outlooks for GDP and are likely the most influential on**
20 **investors' expectations of future growth outlooks. The consensus economists'**
21 **published GDP growth rate outlook is 4.2% over the next 10 years.¹⁵**

22 Therefore, I propose to use the consensus economists' projected 5- and
23 10-year average GDP consensus growth rates of 4.2%, as published by *Blue Chip*

¹⁴*Morningstar, Inc., Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook* inflation rate of 3.0% at 91, and U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, January 29, 2016.

¹⁵*Blue Chip Economic Indicators*, March 10, 2016, at 14.

Economic Indicators, as an estimate of long-term sustainable growth. *Blue Chip Economic Indicators* projections provide real GDP growth projections of 2.1%, and GDP inflation of 2.1%,¹⁶ over the 5-year and 10-year projection periods. These consensus GDP growth forecasts represent the most likely views of market participants because they are based on published consensus economist projections.

Q DO YOU CONSIDER OTHER SOURCES OF PROJECTED LONG-TERM GDP GROWTH?

A Yes, and these sources corroborate my consensus analysts' projections, as shown below in Table 3.

TABLE 3				
<u>GDP Forecasts</u>				
<u>Source</u>	<u>Term</u>	<u>Real GDP</u>	<u>Inflation</u>	<u>Nominal GDP</u>
EIA – Annual Energy Outlook ¹⁷	25 Yrs	2.4%	1.8%	4.2%
Congressional Budget Office ¹⁸	10 Yrs	2.0%	2.0%	4.0%
Moody's Analytics ¹⁹	30 Yrs	2.0%	2.0%	4.1%
Social Security Administration ²⁰	50 Yrs			4.5%
The Economist Intelligence Unit ²¹	35 Yrs	1.9%	2.0%	3.9%
<i>Blue Chip Economic Indicators</i>	5-10 Yrs	2.1%	2.1%	4.2%

The EIA in its *Annual Energy Outlook* projects real GDP out until 2040. In its 2015 Annual Report, the EIA projects real GDP through 2040 to be in the range of 1.8% to 2.9%, with a midpoint or reference case of 2.4%, and a long-term GDP price

¹⁶*Id.*

1 inflation projection of 1.8%. The EIA data supports a long-term nominal GDP growth
2 outlook of 4.2%.¹⁷

3 Also, the Congressional Budget Office ("CBO") makes long-term economic
4 projections. The CBO is projecting real GDP growth to be 2.0% during the next
5 10 years, with a GDP price inflation outlook of 2.0%.¹⁸ The CBO 10-year outlook for
6 nominal GDP based on this projection is 4.0%.

7 Moody's Analytics also makes long-term economic projections. In its recent
8 30-year outlook to 2045, Moody's Analytics is projecting real GDP growth of 2.0%
9 with GDP inflation of 2.0%.¹⁹ Based on these projections, Moody's is projecting
10 nominal GDP growth of 4.1% over the next 30 years.

11 The Social Security Administration makes long-term economic projections out
12 to 2090. The Social Security Administration's nominal GDP projection, under its
13 intermediate cost scenario of 50 years, is 4.5%.²⁰ This projection is in line with the
14 consensus economists.

15 The Economist Intelligence Unit, a division of *The Economist* and a third-party
16 data provider to SNL Financial, makes a long-term economic projection out to 2050.²¹
17 The Economist Intelligence Unit is projecting real GDP growth of 1.9% with an
18 inflation rate of 2.0% out to 2050. The real GDP growth projection is in line with the
19 consensus economists. The long-term nominal GDP projection based on these
20 outlooks is approximately 3.9%.

21 The real GDP and nominal GDP growth projections made by these
22 independent sources support the use of the consensus economist 5-year and 10-year

A-38. ¹⁷DOE/EIA Annual Energy Outlook 2015 With Projections to 2040, January 2016, at 4 and

¹⁸CBO: *The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2016 to 2026*, January 2016, at 140.

¹⁹www.economy.com, *Moody's Analytics Forecast*, January 6, 2016.

²⁰www.ssa.gov, "2015 OASDI Trustees Report," Table VI.G4.

²¹SNL Financial, *Economist Intelligence Unit*, downloaded on January 13, 2016.

1 projected GDP growth outlooks as a reasonable estimate of market participants'
2 long-term GDP growth outlooks.

3 **Q WHAT STOCK PRICE, DIVIDEND, AND GROWTH RATES DID YOU USE IN YOUR**
4 **MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?**

5 A I relied on the same 13-week average stock prices and the most recent quarterly
6 dividend payment data discussed above. For stage one growth, I used the
7 consensus analysts' growth rate projections discussed above in my constant growth
8 DCF model. The first stage growth covers the first five years, consistent with the term
9 of the analyst growth rate projections. The second stage, or transition stage, begins
10 in year 6 and extends through year 10. The second stage growth transitions the
11 growth rate from the first stage to the third stage using a linear trend. For the third
12 stage, or long-term sustainable growth stage, which starts in year 11, I used a 4.2%
13 long-term sustainable growth rate, which is based on the consensus economists'
14 long-term projected nominal GDP growth rate.

15 **Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF MODEL?**

16 A As shown in Exhibit MPG-10, the average and median DCF returns on equity for my
17 proxy group using the 13-week average stock price are 7.99% and 7.89%,
18 respectively.

19 **Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE THE RESULTS FROM YOUR DCF ANALYSES.**

20 A The results from my DCF analyses are summarized in Table 4 below:

TABLE 4		
<u>Summary of DCF Results</u>		
<u>Description</u>	<u>Proxy Group</u>	
	<u>Average</u>	<u>Median</u>
Constant Growth DCF Model (Analysts' Growth)	8.71%	8.70%
Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth)	8.06%	7.72%
Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model	<u>7.99%</u>	<u>7.89%</u>
Average	8.25%	8.10%

I concluded that my DCF studies support a return on equity of 8.70%, which is primarily based on my constant growth DCF result, which I find as a reasonable high-end DCF return estimate.

III.H. Risk Premium Model

Q PLEASE DESCRIBE YOUR BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM MODEL.

A This model is based on the principle that investors require a higher return to assume greater risk. Common equity investments have greater risk than bonds because bonds have more security of payment in bankruptcy proceedings than common equity and the coupon payments on bonds represent contractual obligations. In contrast, companies are not required to pay dividends or guarantee returns on common equity investments. Therefore, common equity securities are considered to be more risky than bond securities.

This risk premium model is based on two estimates of an equity risk premium. First, I estimated the difference between the required return on utility common equity investments and U.S. Treasury bonds. The difference between the required return on common equity and the Treasury bond yield is the risk premium. I estimated the risk

1 premium on an annual basis for each year over the period 1986 through 2015. The
2 common equity required returns were based on regulatory commission-authorized
3 returns for electric utility companies. Authorized returns are typically based on expert
4 witnesses' estimates of the contemporary investor-required return.

5 The second equity risk premium estimate is based on the difference between
6 regulatory commission-authorized returns on common equity and contemporary
7 "A" rated utility bond yields by Moody's. I selected the period 1986 through 2015
8 because public utility stocks consistently traded at a premium to book value during
9 that period. This is illustrated in Exhibit MPG-11, which shows that the market to
10 book ratio since 1986 for the electric utility industry was consistently above a multiple
11 of 1.0x. Over this period, regulatory authorized returns were sufficient to support
12 market prices that at least exceeded book value. This is an indication that regulatory
13 authorized returns on common equity supported a utility's ability to issue additional
14 common stock without diluting existing shares. It further demonstrates that utilities
15 were able to access equity markets without a detrimental impact on current
16 shareholders.

17 Based on this analysis, as shown in Exhibit MPG-12, the average indicated
18 equity risk premium over U.S. Treasury bond yields has been 5.46%. Since the risk
19 premium can vary depending upon market conditions and changing investor risk
20 perceptions, I believe using an estimated range of risk premiums provides the best
21 method to measure the current return on common equity for a risk premium
22 methodology.

23 I incorporated five-year and 10-year rolling average risk premiums over the
24 study period to gauge the variability over time of risk premiums. These rolling
25 average risk premiums mitigate the impact of anomalous market conditions and

1 skewed risk premiums over an entire business cycle. As shown on my Exhibit
2 MPG-12, the five-year rolling average risk premium over Treasury bonds ranged from
3 4.25% to 6.71%, while the 10-year rolling average risk premium ranged from 4.38%
4 to 6.38%.

5 As shown on my Exhibit MPG-13, the average indicated equity risk premium
6 over contemporary Moody's utility bond yields was 4.08%. The five-year and 10-year
7 rolling average risk premiums ranged from 2.88% to 5.53% and 3.20% to 5.01%,
8 respectively.

9 **Q DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE TIME PERIOD USED TO DERIVE THESE EQUITY**
10 **RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES IS APPROPRIATE TO FORM ACCURATE**
11 **CONCLUSIONS ABOUT CONTEMPORARY MARKET CONDITIONS?**

12 **A** Yes. The time period I use in this risk premium study is a generally accepted period
13 to develop a risk premium study using "expectational" data.

14 Contemporary market conditions can change dramatically during the period
15 that rates determined in this proceeding will be in effect. A relatively long period of
16 time where stock valuations reflect premiums to book value is an indication that the
17 authorized returns on equity and the corresponding equity risk premiums were
18 supportive of investors' return expectations and provided utilities access to the equity
19 markets under reasonable terms and conditions. Further, this time period is long
20 enough to smooth abnormal market movement that might distort equity risk
21 premiums. While market conditions and risk premiums do vary over time, this
22 historical time period is a reasonable period to estimate contemporary risk premiums.

23 Alternatively, some studies, such as Morningstar referred to later in this
24 testimony, have recommended that use of "actual achieved investment return data" in

1 a risk premium study should be based on long historical time periods. The studies
2 find that achieved returns over short time periods may not reflect investors' expected
3 returns due to unexpected and abnormal stock price performance. Short-term
4 abnormal actual returns would be smoothed over time and the achieved actual
5 investment returns over long time periods would approximate investors' expected
6 returns. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that averages of annual achieved
7 returns over long time periods will generally converge on the investors' expected
8 returns.

9 My risk premium study is based on expectational data, not actual investment
10 returns, and, thus, need not encompass a very long historical time period.

11 **Q BASED ON HISTORICAL DATA, WHAT RISK PREMIUM HAVE YOU USED TO**
12 **ESTIMATE TEP'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

13 **A** The equity risk premium should reflect the relative market perception of risk in the
14 utility industry today. I have gauged investor perceptions in utility risk today in Exhibit
15 MPG-14. In Exhibit MPG-14, I show the yield spread between utility bonds and
16 Treasury bonds over the last 36 years. As shown in this exhibit, the average utility
17 bond yield spreads over Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated utility bonds for this
18 historical period are 1.52% and 1.97%, respectively. The utility bond yield spreads
19 over Treasury bonds for "A" and "Baa" rated utilities for 2016 were 1.46% and 2.58%,
20 respectively. The current average "A" rated utility bond yield spread over Treasury
21 bond yields is now lower than the 36-year average spread. The current "Baa" rated
22 utility bond yield spread over Treasury bond yields is higher than the 36-year average
23 spread.

1 A current 13-week average "A" rated utility bond yield of 4.05%, when
2 compared to the current Treasury bond yield of 2.64% as shown in Exhibit MPG-15,
3 page 1, implies a yield spread of around 141 basis points. This current utility bond
4 yield spread is lower than the 36-year average spread for "A" rated utility bonds of
5 1.52%. The current spread for the "Baa" rated utility bond yield of 2.27% is higher
6 than the 36-year average spread of 1.97%. However, when compared to the
7 projected Treasury bond yield of 3.50%, the current "Baa" utility spread is around
8 1.41%, which is lower than the 36-year average of 1.97%.

9 These utility bond yield spreads are evidence that the market perception of
10 utility risk is about average relative to this historical time period and demonstrate that
11 utilities continue to have strong access to capital in the current market.

12 **Q HOW DID YOU ESTIMATE TEP'S COST OF COMMON EQUITY WITH THIS RISK**
13 **PREMIUM MODEL?**

14 **A** I added a projected long-term Treasury bond yield to my estimated equity risk
15 premium over Treasury yields. The 13-week average 30-year Treasury bond yield,
16 ending May 13, 2016, was 2.64%, as shown in Exhibit MPG-15. *Blue Chip Financial*
17 *Forecasts* projects the 30-year Treasury bond yield to be 3.50%, and a 10-year
18 Treasury bond yield to be 2.8%.²² Using the projected 30-year Treasury bond yield of
19 3.50%, and a Treasury bond risk premium of 4.25% to 6.71%, as developed above,
20 produces an estimated common equity return in the range of 7.75% (3.50% + 4.25%)
21 to 10.21% (3.50% + 6.71%). My risk premium estimates fall in the range of 7.75% to
22 10.21%.

²²*Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, May 1, 2016 at 2.

1 I next added my equity risk premium over utility bond yields to a current
2 13-week average yield on "Baa" rated utility bonds for the period ending May 13,
3 2016, of 4.91%. Adding the utility equity risk premium of 2.88% to 5.53%, as
4 developed above, to a "Baa" rated bond yield of 5.53%, produces a cost of equity in
5 the range of 7.79% (4.91% + 2.88%) to 10.44% (4.91% + 5.53%).

6 **Q HOW DO YOU DETERMINE WHERE A REASONABLE RISK PREMIUM IS IN THE**
7 **CURRENT MARKET?**

8 **A** I observed the spread of Treasury securities relative to public utility bonds and
9 corporate bonds in gauging whether or not the risk premium in current market prices
10 is relatively stable relative to the past. What this observation of market evidence
11 provides, and quite clearly, is that the valuations in the current market place an above
12 average risk premium on securities that have greater risk.

13 This market evidence is summarized below in Table 5, which shows the utility
14 bond yield spreads over Treasury bond yields on average for the period 1980 through
15 2016, and the spreads for the first quarter of 2016. I also show the corporate bond
16 yield spreads for Aaa corporates and Baa corporates.

TABLE 5				
<u>Comparison of Yield Spreads Over Treasury Bonds</u>				
<u>Description</u>	<u>Utility</u>		<u>Corporate</u>	
	<u>A</u>	<u>Baa</u>	<u>Aaa</u>	<u>Baa</u>
Average Historical Spread	1.52%	1.97%	0.84%	1.95%
2016 Spread	1.46%	2.58%	1.21%	2.59%
Source: Exhibit MPG-14.				

1 The observable yield spreads shown in the table above illustrate that
2 securities of greater risk have above average risk premiums relative to the long-term
3 historical average risk premium. Specifically, A-rated utility bonds to Treasuries, a
4 relatively low-risk investment, have a yield spread in 2016 that has been very
5 comparable to that of its long-term historical yield spread. The Aaa corporate bond
6 yield spread is actually below the yield spread over the last 36 years. This is an
7 indication that low risk investments like Aaa corporate bond yield and A-rated utility
8 bond yield have premium values relative to minimal risk Treasury securities.

9 In contrast, the higher risk Baa utility and corporate bond yields currently have
10 an above average yield spread of approximately 60 basis points (2.58% vs. 1.97%).
11 The higher risk Baa utility bond yields do not have the same premium valuations as
12 their lower risk A-rated utility bond yields, and thus the yield spread for greater risk
13 investments is wider than lower risk investments.

14 This illustrates that securities with greater risk such as Baa yields versus
15 A yields are commanding above average risk premium spreads in the current
16 marketplace. Utility equity securities are greater risk than Baa utility bonds. Because
17 greater risk securities appear to support an above average risk premium relative to

1 historical averages, this would support an above average risk premium in measuring
2 a fair return on equity for a utility stock or equity security.

3 **Q WHAT IS YOUR RECOMMENDED RETURN FOR TEP BASED ON YOUR RISK**
4 **PREMIUM STUDY?**

5 **A** To be conservative, I am recommending slightly more weight to the high-end risk
6 premium estimates than the low-end. I state this because of the relatively low level of
7 interest rates now, but relative upward movements of utility yields more recently.
8 Hence, I propose to provide 75% weight to my high-end risk premium estimates and
9 25% to the low-end. Applying these weights, the risk premium for Treasury bond
10 yields would be approximately 6.1%,²³ which is considerably higher than the 31-year
11 average risk premium of 5.46% and reasonably reflective of the 3.5% projected
12 Treasury bond yield. A Treasury bond risk premium of 6.1% and projected Treasury
13 bond yield of 3.5% produce a risk premium estimate of 9.60%. Similarly, applying
14 these weights to the utility risk premium indicates a risk premium of 4.87%.²⁴ This
15 risk premium is above the 31-year historical average risk premium of 4.08%. This risk
16 premium in connection with the current Baa observable utility bond yield of 4.91%
17 produces an estimated return on equity of 9.78%.

18 Based on this methodology, my Treasury bond risk premium is 9.60% and my
19 utility bond risk premium indicates a return of 9.78%. This methodology produces a
20 return on equity in the range of 9.60% to 9.80%, with a midpoint of 9.70%.

²³(4.25% * 25%) + (6.71% * 75%) = 6.09%.

²⁴(2.88% * 25%) + (5.53% * 75%) = 4.87%.

1 **III.I. Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM")**

2 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE CAPM.**

3 A The CAPM method of analysis is based upon the theory that the market-required rate
4 of return for a security is equal to the risk-free rate, plus a risk premium associated
5 with the specific security. This relationship between risk and return can be expressed
6 mathematically as follows:

7 $R_i = R_f + B_i \times (R_m - R_f)$ where:

8 R_i = Required return for stock i

9 R_f = Risk-free rate

10 R_m = Expected return for the market portfolio

11 B_i = Beta - Measure of the risk for stock

12 The stock-specific risk term in the above equation is beta. Beta represents
13 the investment risk that cannot be diversified away when the security is held in a
14 diversified portfolio. When stocks are held in a diversified portfolio, firm-specific risks
15 can be eliminated by balancing the portfolio with securities that react in the opposite
16 direction to firm-specific risk factors (e.g., business cycle, competition, product mix,
17 and production limitations).

18 The risks that cannot be eliminated when held in a diversified portfolio are
19 non-diversifiable risks. Non-diversifiable risks are related to the market in general
20 and are referred to as systematic risks. Risks that can be eliminated by diversification
21 are regarded as non-systematic risks. In a broad sense, systematic risks are market
22 risks, and non-systematic risks are business risks. The CAPM theory suggests that
23 the market will not compensate investors for assuming risks that can be diversified
24 away. Therefore, the only risk that investors will be compensated for are systematic

1 or non-diversifiable risks. The beta is a measure of the systematic or
2 non-diversifiable risks.

3 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE INPUTS TO YOUR CAPM.**

4 A The CAPM requires an estimate of the market risk-free rate, the Company's beta, and
5 the market risk premium.

6 **Q WHAT DID YOU USE AS AN ESTIMATE OF THE MARKET RISK-FREE RATE?**

7 A As previously noted, *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts'* projected 30-year Treasury bond
8 yield is 3.50%.²⁵ The current 30-year Treasury bond yield is 2.64%, as shown in
9 Exhibit MPG-15. I used *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts'* projected 30-year Treasury
10 bond yield of 3.50% for my CAPM analysis.

11 **Q WHY DID YOU USE LONG-TERM TREASURY BOND YIELDS AS AN ESTIMATE**
12 **OF THE RISK-FREE RATE?**

13 A Treasury securities are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States
14 government, so long-term Treasury bonds are considered to have negligible credit
15 risk. Also, long-term Treasury bonds have an investment horizon similar to that of
16 common stock. As a result, investor-anticipated long-run inflation expectations are
17 reflected in both common stock required returns and long-term bond yields.
18 Therefore, the nominal risk-free rate (or expected inflation rate and real risk-free rate)
19 included in a long-term bond yield is a reasonable estimate of the nominal risk-free
20 rate included in common stock returns.

²⁵*Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, May 1, 2016 at 2.

1 Treasury bond yields, however, do include risk premiums related to
2 unanticipated future inflation and interest rates. A Treasury bond yield is not a
3 risk-free rate. Risk premiums related to unanticipated inflation and interest rates are
4 systematic or market risks. Consequently, for companies with betas less than 1.0,
5 using the Treasury bond yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate in the CAPM analysis
6 can produce an overstated estimate of the CAPM return.

7 **Q WHAT BETA DID YOU USE IN YOUR ANALYSIS?**

8 A As shown in Exhibit MPG-16, the proxy group average *Value Line* beta estimate is
9 0.75.

10 **Q HOW DID YOU DERIVE YOUR MARKET RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATE?**

11 A I derived two market risk premium estimates, a forward-looking estimate and one
12 based on a long-term historical average.

13 The forward-looking estimate was derived by estimating the expected return
14 on the market (as represented by the S&P 500) and subtracting the risk-free rate from
15 this estimate. I estimated the expected return on the S&P 500 by adding an expected
16 inflation rate to the long-term historical arithmetic average real return on the market.
17 The real return on the market represents the achieved return above the rate of
18 inflation.

19 Morningstar's *Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2015 Classic Yearbook*
20 estimates the historical arithmetic average real market return over the period 1926 to
21 2014 as 8.9%.²⁶ A current consensus analysts' inflation projection, as measured by
22 the Consumer Price Index, is 2.3%.²⁷ Using these estimates, the expected market

²⁶ Morningstar, Inc., *Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook* at 92.

²⁷ *Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, May 1, 2016 at 2.

1 return is 11.40%.²⁸ The market risk premium then is the difference between the
2 11.40% expected market return, and my 3.50% risk-free rate estimate, or
3 approximately 7.9%.

4 The historical estimate of the market risk premium was also estimated by
5 Morningstar in *Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation 2015 Classic Yearbook*. Morningstar
6 makes several estimates of the market risk premium based on historical data.
7 Morningstar's estimated market risk premium ranges from a low of 6 percentage
8 points to a high of 7 percentage points. Morningstar estimates its various market risk
9 premium ranges as follows. First, over the period 1926 through 2014, Morningstar's
10 study estimated that the arithmetic average of the achieved total return on the S&P
11 500 was 12.1%,²⁹ and the total return on long-term Treasury bonds was 6.10%.³⁰
12 The indicated market risk premium is 6.0% (12.1% - 6.1% = 6.0%).

13 **Q HOW DOES YOUR ESTIMATED MARKET RISK PREMIUM RANGE COMPARE TO**
14 **THAT ESTIMATED BY MORNINGSTAR?**

15 **A** Morningstar's analysis indicates that a market risk premium falls somewhere in the
16 range of 6.3% to 7.0%. My market risk premium falls in the range of 6.0% to 7.9%.
17 My average market risk premium of 7.0% is within Morningstar's range.

18 Morningstar estimates a forward-looking market risk premium based on actual
19 achieved data from the historical period of 1926 through 2014. Using this data,
20 Morningstar estimates a market risk premium derived from the total return on large
21 company stocks (S&P 500), less the income return on Treasury bonds. The total
22 return includes capital appreciation, dividend or coupon reinvestment returns, and
23 annual yields received from coupons and/or dividend payments. The income return,

²⁸{ [(1 + 0.089) * (1 + 0.023)] - 1 } * 100.

²⁹Morningstar, Inc., *Ibbotson SBBI 2015 Classic Yearbook* at 91.

³⁰*Id.*

1 in contrast, only reflects the income return received from dividend payments or
2 coupon yields. Morningstar claims that the income return is the only true risk-free
3 rate associated with Treasury bonds and is the best approximation of a truly risk-free
4 rate.³¹ I disagree with this assessment from Morningstar, because it does not reflect a
5 true investment option available to the marketplace and therefore does not produce a
6 legitimate estimate of the expected premium of investing in the stock market versus
7 that of Treasury bonds. Nevertheless, I will use Morningstar's conclusion to show the
8 reasonableness of my market risk premium estimates.

9 Morningstar's range is based on several methodologies. First, Morningstar
10 estimates a market risk premium of 7.0% based on the difference between the total
11 market return on common stocks (S&P 500) less the income return on Treasury bond
12 investments. Second, Morningstar found that if the New York Stock Exchange
13 ("NYSE") was used as the market index rather than the S&P 500, that the market risk
14 premium would be 6.8%, not 7.0%. Third, if only the two deciles of the largest
15 companies included in the NYSE were considered, the market risk premium would be
16 6.3%.³²

17 Finally, Morningstar found that the 7.0% market risk premium based on the
18 S&P 500 was influenced by an abnormal expansion of price-to-earnings ("P/E") ratios
19 relative to earnings and dividend growth during the period 1980 through 2001.
20 Morningstar believes this abnormal P/E expansion is not sustainable.³³ Therefore,
21 Morningstar adjusted this market risk premium estimate to normalize the growth in the
22 P/E ratio to be more in line with the growth in dividends and earnings. Based on this

³¹*Id.* at 153.

³²Morningstar observes that the S&P 500 and the NYSE Decile 1-2 are both large capitalization benchmarks. *Id.* at 152.

³³*Id.* at 156.

1 alternative methodology, Morningstar published a long-horizon supply-side market
2 risk premium of 6.1%.³⁴

3 **Q WHAT ARE THE RESULTS OF YOUR CAPM ANALYSIS?**

4 **A** As shown in Exhibit MPG-17, based on my low market risk premium of 6.0% and my
5 high market risk premium of 7.9%, a risk-free rate of 3.50%, and a beta of 0.75, my
6 CAPM analysis produces a return of 8.01% to 9.44%. Based on my assessment of
7 risk premiums in the current market, as discussed above, I recommend giving 75%
8 weight to my high-end CAPM return estimate and 25% weight to the low-end return
9 estimate. This produces a recommended CAPM return estimate of approximately
10 9.08%,³⁵ rounded to 9.1%.

11 **III.J. Return on Equity Summary**

12 **Q BASED ON THE RESULTS OF YOUR RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY**
13 **ANALYSES DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY DO**
14 **YOU RECOMMEND FOR TEP?**

15 **A** Based on my analyses, I estimate TEP's current market cost of equity to be 9.3%.

³⁴*Id.* at 157.

³⁵ $(8.01\% * 25\%) + (9.44\% * 75\%) = 9.08\%$.

TABLE 6	
<u>Return on Common Equity Summary</u>	
<u>Description</u>	<u>Results</u>
DCF	8.7%
Risk Premium	9.7%
CAPM	9.1%

1 My recommended return on common equity of 9.30% is at the approximate
2 midpoint of my estimated range of 8.9% to 9.7%. As shown in Table 6 above, the
3 high-end of my estimated range is based on my risk premium studies. The low-end is
4 based on my DCF studies and CAPM return.

5 My return on equity estimates reflect observable market evidence, the impact
6 on Federal Reserve policies on current and expected long-term capital market costs,
7 an assessment of the current risk premium built into current market securities, and a
8 general assessment of the current investment risk characteristics of the electric utility
9 industry, and the market's demand for utility securities.

10 III.K. Financial Integrity

11 **Q WILL YOUR RECOMMENDED OVERALL RATE OF RETURN SUPPORT AN**
12 **INVESTMENT GRADE BOND RATING FOR TEP?**

13 **A** Yes. I have reached this conclusion by comparing the key credit rating financial
14 ratios for TEP, at my proposed return on equity, and the Company's actual test-year-
15 end capital structure, to S&P's benchmark financial ratios using S&P's new credit
16 metric ranges.

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE MOST RECENT S&P FINANCIAL RATIO CREDIT
2 METRIC METHODOLOGY.

3 A S&P publishes a matrix of financial ratios that correspond to its assessment of the
4 business risk of utility companies and related bond ratings. On May 27, 2009, S&P
5 expanded its matrix criteria by including additional business and financial risk
6 categories.³⁶

7 Based on S&P's most recent credit matrix, the business risk profile categories
8 are "Excellent," "Strong," "Satisfactory," "Fair," "Weak," and "Vulnerable." Most
9 utilities have a business risk profile of "Excellent" or "Strong."

10 The financial risk profile categories are "Minimal," "Modest," "Intermediate,"
11 "Significant," "Aggressive," and "Highly Leveraged." Most of the utilities have a
12 financial risk profile of "Aggressive." TEP has a "Strong" business risk profile and a
13 "Significant" financial risk profile.

14 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE S&P'S USE OF THE FINANCIAL BENCHMARK RATIOS IN
15 ITS CREDIT RATING REVIEW.

16 A S&P evaluates a utility's credit rating based on an assessment of its financial and
17 business risks. A combination of financial and business risks equates to the overall
18 assessment of TEP's total credit risk exposure. On November 19, 2013, S&P
19 updated its methodology. In its update, S&P published a matrix of financial ratios that
20 defines the level of financial risk as a function of the level of business risk.

21 S&P publishes ranges for three primary financial ratios that it uses as
22 guidance in its credit review for utility companies. The two core financial ratio
23 benchmarks it relies on in its credit rating process include: (1) Debt to Earnings

³⁶S&P updated its 2008 credit metric guidelines in 2009, and incorporated utility metric benchmarks with the general corporate rating metrics. *Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect*: "Criteria Methodology: Business Risk/Financial Risk Matrix Expanded," May 27, 2009.

1 Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization ("EBITDA"); and (2) Funds
2 From Operations ("FFO") to Total Debt.³⁷

3 **Q HOW DID YOU APPLY S&P'S FINANCIAL RATIOS TO TEST THE**
4 **REASONABLENESS OF YOUR RATE OF RETURN RECOMMENDATIONS?**

5 A I calculated each of S&P's financial ratios based on TEP's cost of service for its retail
6 jurisdictional operations. While S&P would normally look at total consolidated TEP
7 financial ratios in its credit review process, my investigation in this proceeding is not
8 the same as S&P's. I am attempting to judge the reasonableness of my proposed
9 cost of capital for rate-setting in TEP's retail regulated utility operations. Hence, I am
10 attempting to determine whether my proposed rate of return will in turn support cash
11 flow metrics, balance sheet strength, and earnings that will support an investment
12 grade bond rating and TEP's financial integrity.

13 **Q DID YOU INCLUDE ANY OFF-BALANCE SHEET DEBT EQUIVALENTS?**

14 A Yes. As shown on page 3 of my Exhibit MPG-18, I included \$8.9 million of
15 off-balance sheet debt equivalents attributed to operating leases and their associated
16 interest and depreciation expenses. I did not include some of the off-balance sheet
17 debt equivalents that S&P includes in its credit rating review. Certain off-balance
18 sheet debt equivalents, such as pension and other post-employment benefits
19 ("OPEB"), and accrued interest expense, were excluded from my jurisdictional credit
20 metric study because these items are controllable by utility management or do not
21 relate to regulated cost of service.

³⁷ *Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect*: "Criteria: Corporate Methodology," November 19, 2013.

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE RESULTS OF THIS CREDIT METRIC ANALYSIS AS IT
2 RELATES TO TEP.

3 A The S&P financial metric calculations for TEP at a 9.3% return are developed on
4 Exhibit MPG-18, page 1. S&P currently rates TEP's business risk as "Strong" and
5 financial risk as "Significant." The credit metrics produced below, with this financial
6 and business risk outlook by S&P, will be used to assess the strength of the credit
7 metrics based on TEP's retail operations in Arizona.

8 TEP's adjusted total debt ratio is approximately 51%. As shown on page 4 of
9 Exhibit MPG-18, this adjusted debt ratio is lower than S&P's median debt ratio of
10 approximately 54% for BBB-rated utilities and comparable to the S&P median debt
11 ratio of approximately 52% for A-rated utilities. Hence, I concluded this capital
12 structure reasonably supports TEP's current investment grade bond rating. This
13 adjusted total debt ratio will support an investment grade bond rating.

14 Based on an equity return of 9.3%, TEP will be provided an opportunity to
15 produce a debt to Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization
16 ("EBITDA") ratio of 3.3x. This is within S&P's "Intermediate" guideline range of 2.5x
17 to 3.5x,³⁸ which reflects less risk and a stronger metric than needed to support TEP's
18 financial risk ranking of "Significant." This ratio also supports an investment grade
19 credit rating.

20 TEP's retail operations FFO to total debt coverage at a 9.3% equity return is
21 15%, which is within S&P's "Significant" metric guideline range of 13% to 23%. This
22 FFO/total debt ratio will support an investment grade bond rating.

23 At my recommended return on equity of 9.3%, the Company's proposed
24 embedded debt cost, and TEP's actual test-year-end capital structure, TEP's financial

³⁸*Id.*

1 credit metrics continue to be supportive of its investment grade utility bond rating.

2 **IV. RESPONSE TO MS. BULKLEY**

3 **Q WHAT RETURN ON COMMON EQUITY IS TEP PROPOSING FOR THIS**
4 **PROCEEDING?**

5 A Ms. Bulkley, who sponsors TEP's return on equity recommendation, proposes a
6 return on equity of 10.35%.³⁹ Her recommended range of 10.00% to 10.60%⁴⁰ is
7 based on: (1) a constant growth DCF analysis, (2) a multi-stage DCF analysis, (3)
8 CAPM studies, and corroborated by (4) a Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium
9 methodology. Ms. Bulkley also concluded that the appropriate Fair Value Increment
10 for TEP is 1.42% with a resulting ROR-FVRB of 5.69%.

11 **Q ARE MS. BULKLEY'S RETURN ON EQUITY ESTIMATES REASONABLE?**

12 A No. Ms. Bulkley's estimated return on equity range of 10.00% to 10.60% is
13 overstated and should be rejected. Ms. Bulkley's analyses produce excessive results
14 for various reasons, including the following: (1) her constant growth DCF results are
15 based on excessive, unsustainable growth rates; (2) her multi-stage DCF is based on
16 an unrealistic GDP growth estimate; (3) her CAPM is based on inflated market risk
17 premiums; (4) her Bond Yield Plus Risk Premium is based on inflated utility equity
18 risk premiums; and (5) her risk premium studies are based on stale Treasury yields.

19 **Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE MS. BULKLEY'S RETURN ON EQUITY ESTIMATES.**

20 A Ms. Bulkley's return on equity estimates are summarized in Table 7 below. In
21 Column 2, I show the results with prudent and sound adjustments to her common

³⁹Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley at 3.

⁴⁰*Id.*

1 equity return estimates. With such adjustments to her proxy groups' DCF, CAPM,
2 and Risk Premium return estimates, Ms. Bulkley's own studies show my
3 recommended return on equity for TEP is reasonable.

TABLE 7		
Bulkley's Return on Equity Estimates		
Description	Mean ¹	Adjusted ²
	(1)	(2)
<u>Constant Growth DCF:</u>		
30-Day Average	9.59%	9.59%
90-Day Average	9.46%	9.46%
180-Day Average	<u>9.29%</u>	<u>9.29%</u>
Average	9.45%	9.45%
<u>Multi-Stage Growth DCF:</u>		
30-Day Average	9.78%	8.84%
90-Day Average	9.64%	8.70%
180-Day Average	<u>9.44%</u>	<u>8.49%</u>
Average	9.62%	8.68%
DCF Range	9.5% to 9.6%	8.7% to 9.5%
<u>CAPM Results (Bloomberg Beta)</u>		
Current 30-Yr Treasury (3.09%, Revised to 2.72%)	10.28%	7.59%
Near-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (3.57%, Revised to 3.15%)	10.42%	8.02%
Long-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (4.80%, Revised to 4.50%)	<u>10.80%</u>	<u>9.37%</u>
Average	10.50%	8.33%
<u>CAPM Results (Value Line Beta)</u>		
Current 30-Yr Treasury (3.09%, Revised to 2.72%)	11.00%	8.09%
Near-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (3.57%, Revised to 3.15%)	11.12%	8.52%
Long-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (4.80%, Revised to 4.50%)	<u>11.40%</u>	<u>9.87%</u>
Average	11.17%	8.83%
<u>Risk Premium</u>		
Current 30-Yr Treasury (3.09%, Revised to 2.72%)	9.91%	8.37%
Near-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (3.57%, Revised to 3.15%)	10.12%	8.80%
Long-Term Projected 30-Yr Treasury (4.80%, Revised to 4.50%)	<u>10.66%</u>	<u>10.15%</u>
Average	10.23%	9.11%
Range	10.0% - 10.60%	
Recommended Return on Equity	10.35%	
Sources:		
¹ Bulkley Direct Testimony at 53.		
² Exhibit MPG-19.		

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MS. BULKLEY'S CONSTANT GROWTH DCF RETURN
2 ESTIMATES.

3 A Her constant growth DCF returns are developed in Exhibit AEB-1, pages 1-3. Ms.
4 Bulkley's constant growth DCF models are based on consensus growth rates
5 published by Zacks and First Call, and individual growth rate projections made by
6 *Value Line*.

7 Ms. Bulkley concluded that based on the constant growth DCF analyses, her
8 results fall in the range of 9.29% to 9.59%, with a midpoint of 9.45%.⁴¹

9 Q ARE THE DCF RESULTS PRODUCED BY MS. BULKLEY REASONABLE?

10 A Ms. Bulkley's DCF return estimates are overly optimistic because they are based on
11 an average growth rate of approximately 5.55% (Exhibit AEB-1). This growth rate is
12 not a reasonable estimate of long-term sustainable growth because it is significantly
13 higher than the consensus economists' projections of long-term GDP growth of 4.2%
14 as described above in regard to my own DCF studies. As such, her constant growth
15 DCF return should be considered as a high-end estimate of the current market cost of
16 equity.

17 Q DID MS. BULKLEY PERFORM A MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF ANALYSIS?

18 A Yes, she did. However, as a general observation, the results of Ms. Bulkley's multi-
19 stage growth DCF analysis appears to be economically illogical in comparison to her
20 constant growth DCF study. In Ms. Bulkley's constant growth DCF study, she uses a
21 long-term sustainable growth rate of 5.55%, and produces a constant growth DCF
22 result in the range of 9.29% to 9.59%. In her multi-stage model, she uses a long-term

⁴¹Bulkley Direct Testimony at 31.

1 sustainable growth rate of 5.4% which is lower than that included in her constant
2 growth DCF model of 5.55%, but her multi-stage model results on average are 9.62%
3 which are higher than her constant growth study. This seems irrational because the
4 growth rate in her multi-stage growth DCF model is lower than the growth rate in her
5 constant growth DCF model. As such, the results of Ms. Bulkley's DCF studies
6 appear to be illogical and suspect.

7 More specifically to the inputs in Ms. Bulkley's multi-stage DCF analysis, I find
8 her development of a long-term steady-state growth rate of 5.4% is unreasonably
9 high. I believe it is unreasonably high because the long-term steady-state growth rate
10 of 5.4% is considerably higher than the GDP growth rate projections made by
11 independent economists. These independent economists' projections of future GDP
12 growth are available to investors, and likely are used by investors in forming future
13 investment outlooks. This indicates that Ms. Bulkley's assumed 5.4% long-term
14 steady-state growth rate is not reflective of market participants' outlooks for future
15 growth for the proxy group companies.

16 **Q HOW DID MS. BULKLEY CALCULATE A LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE?**

17 **A** Ms. Bulkley relied on the long-term historical real GDP growth of 3.25%, as measured
18 over the period 1929 through 2014. She then adjusted this to a nominal GDP growth
19 by an inflation rate of 2.09%, which is based on: (1) the average long-term projected
20 growth rate in the Consumer Price Index ("CPI") of 2.30%, (2) the compound annual
21 growth rate of the CPI for all-urban consumers for 2025 – 2040 of 2.11% as projected
22 by the EIA, and (3) the compound annual growth rate of the GDP chain-price index
23 for 2025-2040 of 1.85% as reported by the EIA.⁴² Using an inflation factor of 2.09%

⁴²Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley at 20.

1 and an historical real GDP growth of 3.25%, Ms. Bulkley produced a nominal GDP
2 growth rate outlook of 5.40%.⁴³

3 **Q IS MS. BULKLEY'S LONG-TERM GROWTH RATE ESTIMATE OF 5.40%**
4 **REASONABLE?**

5 A No. The methodologies used by Ms. Bulkley to calculate this growth rate simply are
6 not based on market participants' outlooks for future growth opportunities of the proxy
7 companies specifically, or growth of the industry generally. Therefore, these growth
8 rate outlooks simply are not based on data that is likely used by investors to inform
9 investment decisions.

10 Ms. Bulkley's growth rate of 5.40% reflects a historical real GDP growth rate of
11 3.25%. This real GDP growth rate does not reflect consensus analysts' projected
12 future real GDP growth. Again, her long-term growth rate is not reasonable and
13 should be rejected.

14 **Q CAN YOU PROVIDE MORE DETAIL ON WHY MS. BULKLEY'S GDP LONG-TERM**
15 **GROWTH RATE IS NOT REFLECTIVE OF CURRENT MARKET EXPECTATIONS?**

16 A Yes. In order to measure the current market cost of equity demanded by investors in
17 today's marketplace, it is necessary to reasonably capture the outlooks by investors
18 used to form observable stock prices used in the various time periods underlying Ms.
19 Bulkley's and my DCF studies. Ms. Bulkley's growth rates simply ignore current
20 consensus analysts' outlooks for future growth, and therefore are not a reasonable
21 estimate of what market participants have relied on in order to produce those market
22 valuations, for example.

⁴³*Id.*

The consensus economists' projected GDP growth rate is much lower than the GDP growth rate used by Ms. Bulkley in her DCF analysis. A comparison of Ms. Bulkley's GDP growth rate and consensus economists' projected growth over the next 5 and 10 years is shown in Table 8. As shown in this table, Ms. Bulkley's GDP rate of 5.40% reflects real GDP of 3.3% and GDP inflation of 2.1%. However, consensus economists' projections of nominal GDP over the next 5 and 10 years are 4.2%.

As is clearly evident in Table 8, Ms. Bulkley's historical GDP growth is much higher than, and not representative of, consensus market expected forward-looking GDP growth.

TABLE 8			
<u>GDP Projections</u>			
<u>Description</u>	<u>GDP Inflation</u>	<u>Real GDP</u>	<u>Nominal GDP</u>
Ms. Bulkley ¹	2.1%	3.3%	5.40%
Consensus Economists (5-Year) ²	2.1%	2.1%	4.20%
Consensus Economists (10-Year) ²	2.0%	2.1%	4.20%
Sources:			
¹ Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley at 28.			
² <i>Blue Chip Economic Indicators</i> , March 10, 2016 at 14.			

Ms. Bulkley's 5.40% nominal GDP growth rate is not reflective of consensus market expectations and should be rejected. Indeed, Ms. Bulkley's 5.40% GDP growth rate outlook is inconsistent with the consensus of economists' independent projections of future long-term GDP growth, and is also inconsistent with projections made by the U.S. EIA and CBO (as referenced in my testimony above where I describe the parameters used in my own multi-stage growth DCF analyses). Those agencies also project nominal GDP much more consistent with the consensus independent economists' projections discussed in Table 8 above. For all these

1 reasons, Ms. Bulkley's GDP growth outlook rate projections are simply out of line and
2 out of touch with the consensus market outlooks.

3 **Q HOW WOULD MS. BULKLEY'S MULTI-STAGE GROWTH DCF MODEL CHANGE**
4 **IF YOU USE THE CONSENSUS ECONOMISTS' LONG-TERM SUSTAINABLE**
5 **GROWTH RATE?**

6 **A** As shown below in Table 9, revising the GDP growth rate to the consensus analysts'
7 projection of 4.2% reduces Ms. Bulkley's midpoint multi-stage growth DCF return from
8 9.62% to 8.68%.

TABLE 9		
<u>Bulkley Multi-Stage Growth DCF Analysis</u>		
<u>Description</u>	<u>Mean¹</u>	<u>Adjusted²</u>
	(1)	(2)
30-Day Average	9.78%	8.84%
90-Day Average	9.64%	8.70%
180-Day Average	<u>9.44%</u>	<u>8.49%</u>
Average	9.62%	8.68%
Sources:		
¹ Bulkley Direct Testimony at 53.		
² Exhibit MPG-19.		

9 **Q WHAT IS A REASONABLE DCF RETURN FOR TEP BASED ON MS. BULKLEY'S**
10 **CONSTANT GROWTH DCF ESTIMATES AND YOUR SOUND ADJUSTMENTS TO**
11 **HER MULTI-STAGE DCF RESULTS?**

12 **A** Giving equal weight to Ms. Bulkley's constant growth DCF estimates (9.45%) and my
13 revision of her multi-stage DCF estimates (8.68%), the return on equity for TEP falls
14 in the range of 8.7% to 9.5%, with a midpoint of 9.1%.

1 Q DO YOU AGREE WITH MS. BULKLEY THAT THE DCF RESULTS ARE
2 AFFECTED BY ANOMALOUS MARKET CONDITIONS?

3 A While I agree with Ms. Bulkley that certain DCF returns produce lower cost of equity,
4 some DCF estimates based on excessive growth rates produce an overstated cost of
5 equity. However, these anomalous conditions as discussed by Ms. Bulkley also
6 affect the inputs for other forward-looking methodologies such as the CAPM and risk
7 premium. Therefore, to minimize the drawbacks of each model, the Commission
8 should not consider the results of any single methodology in isolation. Hence, to
9 produce a more reliable and fair return estimate for TEP, the Commission should
10 consider the results from various cost of capital methodologies. I believe this
11 approach will balance the interests of all stakeholders and produce a fair return on
12 equity for TEP.

13 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE THE ISSUES YOU TAKE WITH MS. BULKLEY'S CAPM
14 ANALYSES.

15 A My major concern with Ms. Bulkley's CAPM analysis is her inflated market risk
16 premium estimates. I also take issue with Ms. Bulkley's stale risk-free rates based on
17 *Blue Chip* publications which are almost a year old.

18 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MS. BULKLEY'S MARKET RISK PREMIUMS.

19 A Ms. Bulkley developed three market risk premium estimates. They are DCF-derived
20 market risk premiums of 10.33%, 9.85% and 8.61%, which are based on market DCF
21 returns of 13.41%, less the current, near-term projected and long-term projected
22 30-year Treasury bond yields of 3.09%, 3.57% and 4.80%, respectively.⁴⁴

⁴⁴Direct Testimony of Ann Bulkley at 39-40 and Exhibit AEB-5.

1 Q WHAT ISSUES DO YOU HAVE WITH MS. BULKLEY'S DCF-DERIVED MARKET
2 RISK PREMIUM ESTIMATES?

3 A Ms. Bulkley's DCF-derived market risk premiums are based on a market return of
4 13.41%, which consists of a growth rate component of approximately 11.23% and a
5 dividend yield of approximately 2.07%.⁴⁵ As discussed above, the DCF model
6 requires a long-term sustainable growth rate. Ms. Bulkley's sustainable market
7 growth rate of over 11.0% is far too high to be a rational outlook for sustainable long-
8 term market growth. These growth rates are more than two times the growth rate of
9 the U.S. GDP long-term growth outlook of 4.2%.

10 As a result of this unreasonable long-term market growth rate estimate, Ms.
11 Bulkley's market DCF returns are inflated and not reliable. Consequently, Ms.
12 Bulkley's 10.33% (3.09%), 9.85% (3.57%) and 8.61% (4.80%) market risk premiums
13 are inflated and not reliable.

14 Q IS THERE INFORMATION ON ACTUAL ACHIEVED CAPITAL APPRECIATION
15 FOR THE MARKET INDEX USED BY MS. BULKLEY?

16 A Yes. Morningstar estimates the actual capital appreciation for the S&P 500 over the
17 period 1926 through 2014 to have been 5.9% to 7.8%.⁴⁶ While I do not endorse the
18 use of a historical growth rate to draw assessments of the market's forward-looking
19 growth rate outlooks, this data can be used to show how the market return estimates
20 produced by Ms. Bulkley are unreasonable and inflated. Specifically, using the
21 highest historical arithmetic average growth rate of 7.8% and an expected average
22 dividend yield of 2.1% as estimated by Ms. Bulkley, would suggest a forward-looking
23 market DCF return estimate of 9.9%. Further, simply observing the geometric and

⁴⁵Exhibit AEB-5.

⁴⁶2015 Ibbotson *S&P Classic Yearbook* at 91.

1 arithmetic average historical market risk premium also shows these estimates to be
2 reasonable, and Ms. Bulkley's estimated DCF return on the market of approximately
3 13.41% to be excessive. Specifically, historically, the geometric and arithmetic
4 average total return on the market has ranged from 10.1% to 12.1%.⁴⁷

5 Virtually all historical data shows that Ms. Bulkley's 13.41% projected return
6 on the market is excessive and produces an inflated market risk premium.

7 **Q WHAT ISSUES DO YOU HAVE WITH MS. BULKLEY'S RISK-FREE RATES?**

8 A Ms. Bulkley's risk-free rates are based on Bloomberg's current and *Blue Chip*
9 projected 30-year Treasury yields, which are almost a year old. Based on the most
10 recent *Blue Chip* publication the current, near-term and projected 30-year Treasury
11 yields are 2.72%,⁴⁸ 3.15%⁴⁹ and 4.50%,⁵⁰ respectively.

12 **Q CAN MS. BULKLEY'S CAPM ANALYSIS BE REVISED TO REFLECT A MORE**
13 **REASONABLE MARKET RISK PREMIUM?**

14 A Yes. Using (1) the updated risk-free rates of 2.72%, 3.15% and 4.50%; (2) average
15 published Bloomberg and *Value Line* beta estimates of 0.696 and 0.767,⁵¹
16 respectively; and (3) the 7.00% market risk premium, which is the highest Morningstar
17 estimate of the market risk premium, Ms. Bulkley's CAPM would be no higher than
18 8.8%.

⁴⁷*Id.*

⁴⁸*Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, May 1, 2016 at 2.

⁴⁹*Id.*

⁵⁰*Blue Chip Financial Forecasts*, December 1, 2015 at 14.

⁵¹Exhibit AEB-9.

1 **Q PLEASE DESCRIBE MS. BULKLEY'S BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM.**

2 A As shown on TEP Exhibit AEB-6, Ms. Bulkley constructs a risk premium return on
3 equity estimate based on the premise that equity risk premiums are inversely related
4 to interest rates. She estimates an average electric risk premium of 5.65% over the
5 period 1992 through the second quarter of 2015. Then she applies a regression
6 formula to the current, near-term, and long-term projected 30-year Treasury bond
7 yields of 3.09%, 3.57%, and 4.80% to produce electric risk premiums of 9.91%,
8 10.12%, and 10.66%, respectively. The midpoint of Ms. Bulkley's risk premium
9 estimates is 10.23%.

10 **Q IS MS. BULKLEY'S BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM METHODOLOGY**
11 **REASONABLE?**

12 A No. Ms. Bulkley's contention that there is a simplistic inverse relationship between
13 equity risk premiums and interest rates is not supported by academic research. While
14 academic studies have shown that, in the past, there has been an inverse
15 relationship among these variables, researchers have found that the relationship
16 changes over time and is influenced by changes in perception of the risk of bond
17 investments relative to equity investments, and not simply changes to interest rates.⁵²

18 In the 1980s, equity risk premiums were inversely related to interest rates, but
19 that was likely attributable to the interest rate volatility that existed at that time. As
20 such, when interest rates were more volatile, the relative perception of bond
21 investment risk increased relative to the investment risk of equities. This changing
22 investment risk perception caused changes in equity risk premiums.

⁵²"The Market Risk Premium: Expectational Estimates Using Analysts' Forecasts," Robert S. Harris and Felicia C. Marston, *Journal of Applied Finance*, Volume 11, No. 1, 2001 and "The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *Financial Management*, Spring 1985.

1 In today's marketplace, interest rate volatility is not as extreme as it was
2 during the 1980s.⁵³ Nevertheless, changes in the perceived risk of bond investments
3 relative to equity investments still drive changes in equity premiums. However, a
4 relative investment risk differential cannot be measured simply by observing nominal
5 interest rates. Changes in nominal interest rates are heavily influenced by changes
6 to inflation outlooks, which also change equity return expectations. As such, the
7 relevant factor needed to explain changes in equity risk premiums is the relative
8 changes to the risk of equity versus debt securities investments, and not simply
9 changes in interest rates.

10 Importantly, Ms. Bulkley's analysis simply ignores investment risk differentials.
11 She bases her adjustment to the equity risk premium exclusively on changes in
12 nominal interest rates. This is a flawed methodology that does not produce accurate
13 or reliable risk premium estimates.

14 **Q CAN MS. BULKLEY'S BOND YIELD PLUS RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS BE**
15 **REVISED TO REFLECT CURRENT PROJECTIONS OF TREASURY YIELDS?**

16 **A** Yes. Disregarding Ms. Bulkley's simplistic notion of an inverse relationship between
17 interest rates and the risk premium will produce more realistic results. Adding Ms.
18 Bulkley's average equity risk premium of 5.65% to the updated 3.50% consensus
19 economists' projected Treasury bond yield two years out, will produce a CAPM return
20 of 9.15%.

⁵³"The Risk Premium Approach to Measuring a Utility's Cost of Equity," Eugene F. Brigham, Dilip K. Shome, and Steve R. Vinson, *Financial Management*, Spring 1985, at 44.

1 **Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS CONCERNING HER CONTENTION THAT**
2 **INTEREST RATES ARE GOING TO INCREASE SUBSTANTIALLY?**

3 **A** Yes. Ms. Bulkley develops her risk premium studies mainly relying on near-term and
4 long-term projected interest rates, which she believes are expected to increase
5 substantially. Ms. Bulkley's proposal to rely mainly on forecasted Treasury bond
6 yields is unreasonable because she is not considering the highly likely outcome that
7 current observable interest rates will prevail during the period rates determined in this
8 proceeding will be in effect. This is important, because while current observable
9 interest rates are actual market data that provides a measure of the current cost of
10 capital, the accuracy of forecasted interest rates is at very best, problematic.

11 **Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE ACCURACY OF FORECASTED INTEREST**
12 **RATES IS HIGHLY PROBLEMATIC?**

13 **A** Over the last several years, observable current interest rates have been a more
14 accurate predictor of future interest rates than economists' consensus projections.
15 Exhibit MPG-20 illustrates this point. On this exhibit, under Columns 1 and 2, I show
16 the actual market yield at the time a projection is made for Treasury bond yields two
17 years in the future. In Column 1, I show the actual Treasury yield and, in Column 2, I
18 show the projected yield two years out.

19 As shown in Columns 1 and 2, over the last several years, Treasury yields
20 were projected to increase relative to the actual Treasury yields at the time of the
21 projection. In Column 4, I show what the Treasury yield actually turned out to be two
22 years after the forecast. In Column 5, I show the actual yield change at the time of
23 the projections relative to the projected yield change.

1 As shown in this exhibit, over the last several years, economists consistently
2 have been projecting that interest rates will increase. However, as shown in Column
3 5, those yield projections have turned out to be overstated in almost every case.
4 Indeed, actual Treasury yields have decreased or remained flat over the last several
5 years, rather than increased as the economists' projections indicated. As such,
6 current observable interest rates are just as likely to accurately predict future interest
7 rates as are economists' projections.

8 **Q DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER COMMENTS IN REGARD TO MS. BULKLEY'S**
9 **INTEREST RATE PROJECTIONS?**

10 A Yes. First, it is simply not known how much, if any, long-term interest rates will
11 increase from current levels, or whether they have already fully accounted for the
12 termination of the Federal Reserve's Quantitative Easing program and the increase in
13 the Federal Funds rate. Nevertheless, I do agree that this Federal Reserve program
14 introduced risk or uncertainty in long-term interest rate markets. Because of this
15 uncertainty, caution should be taken in estimating TEP's current return on common
16 equity in this case. However, as noted in the EEI quote above, the increase in short-
17 term interest rates had no impact on longer-term yields, "which remain at historically
18 low levels and are influenced more by the level of inflation and economic strength
19 than by the Fed's short-term rate policy."⁵⁴

20 Second, I would note that TEP is largely shielded from significant changes in
21 capital market costs. To the extent that interest rates ultimately increase above
22 current levels, which may have an impact on required returns on common equity, at
23 that point in time, TEP, like all other utilities, can file to change rates to restate its

⁵⁴ EEI Q4 2015 Financial Update: "Stock Performance" at 6.

1 authorized rate of return at the prevailing market levels. On the one hand, we can
2 expect credit rating agencies to like this predictability and consistency in the
3 regulatory process, and to have confidence that the Commission would recognize
4 increases in capital market costs. Yet, on the other hand, customers deserve the
5 protection and symmetrical treatment from the Commission, that as capital market
6 costs decline, and stay at relatively low levels, TEP's authorized rate of return will
7 likewise reflect those low capital market costs. This is an important balancing of
8 interests of a utility's investors and ratepayers.

9 **Q DID MS. BULKLEY CONSIDER ADDITIONAL BUSINESS RISKS TO JUSTIFY A**
10 **RETURN ON EQUITY ABOVE THE MIDPOINT OF HER RANGE?**

11 A Ms. Bulkley believes that TEP's regulatory environment, its substantial capital
12 expenditure plan and risks associated with environmental regulation, relative to the
13 proxy group will warrant a return on equity above the midpoint of her range. I
14 disagree. Setting the return on equity above the midpoint of Ms. Bulkley's range will
15 place an unreasonable burden on the ratepayers and should be rejected. As
16 discussed below, TEP's relative risk is comparable to the risk of the utility companies
17 included in the proxy group.

18 **Q WHY DO YOU BELIEVE THAT TEP FACES RISKS THAT ARE COMPARABLE TO**
19 **THE RISKS FACED BY MS. BULKLEY'S AND YOUR PROXY GROUP**
20 **COMPANIES?**

21 A As shown on my Exhibit MPG-3, the average S&P credit rating for my proxy group of
22 BBB+ is comparable to TEP's credit rating. The relative risks discussed on pages 44-
23 51 of Ms. Bulkley's testimony are already incorporated in the credit ratings of the

1 proxy group companies. S&P and other credit rating agencies go through great detail
2 in assessing a utility's business risk and financial risk in order to evaluate their
3 assessment of its total investment risk. Therefore, this total risk investment
4 assessment of TEP, in comparison to a proxy group, is fully absorbed into the
5 market's perception of TEP's risk and the proxy group fully captures the investment
6 risk of TEP.

7 **Q HOW DOES S&P ASSIGN CORPORATE CREDIT RATINGS FOR REGULATED**
8 **UTILITIES?**

9 **A** In assigning corporate credit ratings the credit rating agency considers both business
10 and financial risks. Business risks among others include company's size and
11 competitive position, generation portfolio, capital expenditure programs as well as a
12 consideration of the regulatory environment, current state of the industry and the
13 economy as whole. Specifically, S&P states:

14 To determine the assessment for a corporate issuer's business risk
15 profile, the criteria combine our assessments of industry risk, country
16 risk, and competitive position. Cash flow/leverage analysis determines
17 a company's financial risk profile assessment. The analysis then
18 combines the corporate issuer's business risk profile assessment and
19 its financial risk profile assessment to determine its anchor. In general,
20 the analysis weighs the business risk profile more heavily for
21 investment-grade anchors, while the financial risk profile carries more
22 weight for speculative-grade anchors.⁵⁵

23 **V. FAIR VALUE**

24 **Q DID MS. BULKLEY RECOMMEND AN ROR-FVRB?**

25 **A** Yes. Ms. Bulkley recommended an ROR-FVRB of 5.69%, which is developed at
26 pages 8 and 9 of her direct testimony. This ROR-FVRB is applied to TEP's estimated

⁵⁵Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Criteria/Corporates/General: Corporate Methodology," November 19, 2013.

1 FVRB of \$2.9 billion. The FVRB is the weighted average of an OCRB of \$2.1 billion
2 (50%) and a Replacement Cost New, Depreciated ("RCND") rate base of \$3.7 billion
3 (50%). On its Schedule A-1, TEP uses an FVRB of \$2.9 billion, and fair value rate of
4 return of 5.69% to derive its requested ROI of \$165.898 million.

5 **Q HOW IS THIS ROR-FVRB USED BY TEP TO DEVELOP ITS REVENUE**
6 **REQUIREMENT IN THIS PROCEEDING?**

7 A As developed on TEP's Schedule A-1, the ROR-FVRB is used to produce a target or
8 ROI of \$165.898 million. This operating income is then used to develop a fair value
9 increment to the Company's ROR-OCRB of 7.34% to produce the same operating
10 income. In order to produce the fair value ROI estimated by the Company, TEP adds
11 a fair value increment of 0.54% to its recommended ROR-OCRB of 7.34%, and
12 proposes to set rates to recover an operating income based on a required ROR-
13 OCRB of 7.88%.

14 **Q IS IT REASONABLE FOR TEP TO REQUEST A FAIR VALUE ADJUSTMENT TO**
15 **ITS ROR-OCRB IN MEASURING ITS ROI FOR THIS CASE?**

16 A No. The ROI of TEP should be based on either an original cost or fair value
17 methodology. It is not appropriate for TEP to add an increment rate of return to the
18 ROR-OCRB in order to support its requested ROI. Indeed, adding an increment to
19 the traditional method of estimating an ROR-OCRB, shows that the proposed
20 operating income of TEP is excessive.

1 **Q WHY SHOULD THE NET OPERATING INCOME BE THE SAME USING EITHER**
2 **AN ORIGINAL COST OR FAIR VALUE METHODOLOGY?**

3 A Investors should be fairly compensated and rates should be just and reasonable
4 using either an original cost or a fair value rate-setting methodology. In an original
5 cost methodology, investors are compensated entirely by the allowed return on rate
6 base. The increase in value of the assets included in rate base is not reflected in the
7 original cost methodology. Therefore, investors are compensated for the expectation
8 that asset values will increase over time, by applying a market-based rate of return to
9 the original cost of assets. This provides total compensation to investors on a current
10 basis through the rate of return.

11 On the other hand, in a fair value methodology, the expected escalation or
12 growth to the value of utility assets is reflected in setting rates. Therefore, the total
13 return to investors in a fair value methodology includes both the expected growth in
14 the value of the assets (i.e., growth in the Fair Value Rate Base), plus the
15 ROR-FVRB.

16 The primary difference between an ROR-OCRB and an ROR-FVRB relates to
17 compensating investors for the expected investment growth. In an ROR-OCRB, the
18 expected growth rate in asset values is included in the rate of return and investors are
19 compensated for this growth in the utility's operating income. Conversely, in a fair
20 value methodology, expected growth in the value of the assets is picked up in the
21 growth to the rate base itself, and not in the rate of return.

22 Regardless of the methodology, however, the net operating income should be
23 approximately the same.

1 Q CAN YOU PROVIDE AN ILLUSTRATION AS TO WHY THE REQUIRED RETURN
2 COMPONENT FOR AN ROR-OCRB AND AN ROR-FVRB SHOULD BE
3 REASONABLY COMPARABLE?

4 A Yes. An example is shown below in Table 10. Under the original cost methodology,
5 if the beginning of year rate base is \$100, the return is assumed to be 10%,
6 escalation to the value of utility assets is assumed to be 3%, and the annual
7 depreciation rate is 3%. Based on these assumptions, depreciation expense for the
8 year would be \$3, and capital expenditures are assumed to be \$3.10, which was
9 developed assuming that 3% of the rate base would be replaced, and the cost of
10 replacement would escalate by 3% per year. The end of year rate base in this
11 example, then, is \$100.10. The current return produced on this rate base is the
12 beginning of year rate base multiplied by the 10% rate of return, or \$10. Hence, the
13 total return on the original cost methodology is \$10, or 10%.

14 In column 2, I show the compensation to investors using a fair value
15 methodology. Here, again, investors' compensation is 10%. In the fair value
16 methodology the beginning of year rate base is \$100, the fair value rate of return is
17 7%, and the asset escalation is 3%. Depreciation expense then would be \$3.10,
18 which is the original cost depreciation expense adjusted by the growth in the value of
19 the asset. Capital expenditures are again \$3.10. Year-end rate base is \$103, which
20 reflects the 3% escalation to the value of the beginning of year rate base. In a fair
21 value methodology, investor compensation is based on the current return of \$7,
22 appreciation in the value of rate base is \$3, for a total investor return of \$10, or 10%.

TABLE 10		
<u>Original Cost and Fair Value Comparison</u>		
<u>Description</u>	<u>Original Cost</u> (1)	<u>Fair Value</u> (2)
Beginning Rate Base	\$100	\$100
Rate of Return	10%	7%
Asset Escalation	3%	3%
Depreciation Expense (3%)	\$3.0	\$3.1
Capital Expenditures	\$3.1	\$3.1
Year-End Rate Base	\$100.1	\$103.0
Current Return	\$10	\$ 7
Asset Appreciation	<u>\$ 0</u>	<u>\$ 3</u>
Total Return	\$10	\$10
Total Return (%)	\$10 (10%)	\$10 (10%)

Q DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS ON MS. BULKLEY'S DEVELOPMENT OF A 5.69% ROR-FVRB?

A Yes. If the Commission chooses to rely on Ms. Bulkley's analysis for adding a fair value increment to the ROR-OCRB, I recommend the ROR-FVRB be updated to reflect more accurate estimates of the current market cost of equity. This is performed as shown on my Exhibit MPG-21. On this exhibit, I reflect the following adjustments to Ms. Bulkley's ROR-FVRB estimate:

1. I weighted the long-term debt and common equity to reflect TEP's actual end-of-test-period capital structure weights of long-term debt and common equity, rather than TEP's proposed end-of-test-year capital structure weights. This corresponds with my proposed capital structure adjustment discussed above.
2. I then relied on a fair return on equity for original cost rate base of 9.3%, rather than the excessive 10.35% return on equity proposed by Ms. Bulkley.
3. I updated her estimate of the current risk-free rate based on Treasury bond yields to reflect current observable market data, and projected Treasury yields over the

1 next two years. I also updated her projected inflation rate to reflect current
2 published projections of future inflation.

3 **Q HOW DID YOU UPDATE MS. BULKLEY'S RISK-FREE RATE ESTIMATE BASED**
4 **ON CURRENT MARKET DATA?**

5 **A** I updated Ms. Bulkley's risk-free rate methodology in two ways. First, I updated Ms.
6 Bulkley's proposed use of observable nominal yields on 30-year Treasury bonds, less
7 a projected level of inflation. However, I relied on current observable yields on
8 Treasury bonds and projected Treasury yields out over the next two years. This
9 period of Treasury bond yields is likely to reflect TEP's actual capital costs during the
10 period rates will be in effect.

11 In contrast, Ms. Bulkley used projected Treasury bond yields five and 10 years
12 out. These levels of projected Treasury bond yields will not impact TEP's cost of
13 capital when the rates are in effect, and the accuracy of the longer term projected
14 yield is far more uncertain than current and short-term projected Treasury yields.
15 Therefore, Treasury yield projected out five to 10 years does not reasonably reflect
16 TEP's cost of capital in this proceeding.

17 I also performed an estimate of the market risk-free rate by looking at
18 Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities ("TIPS") during the 13-week period ending
19 May 13, 2016. This is the same time period I estimated the dividend yields in my
20 DCF study. TIPS are securities that reflect the market's assessment of a real return
21 on Treasury bonds in the current marketplace. TIPS are Treasury bond securities
22 that are indexed to inflation. Interest rates on these bonds are fixed, but the par value
23 of the bond increases annually with inflation as measured by the Consumer Price
24 Index. TIPS are considered very low risk investments because they are Treasury
25 bond securities, whose par value is hedged against changes in inflation.

1 As shown on my Exhibit MPG-22, my update to Ms. Bulkley's method of
2 estimating a real risk-free rate implies a current real risk-free rate in the marketplace
3 of 0.92%. This is based on a projected inflation rate of 2.1%, and an average of the
4 current yield on 30-year Treasury bonds of 2.64%, and a projection through the third
5 quarter of 2017 for Treasury bond yields of 3.5%. The average current and projected
6 Treasury bond yield of 3.07% less the inflation projection of 2.13% produces a real
7 return on Treasury investments of 0.92%.

8 My second estimate using a 13-week average 30-year TIPS yield also implies
9 a real return of 0.92%. The yields on the TIPS are based on observable bond yields,
10 relative to the interest rates paid on the TIPS over the 13-week period ending May 13,
11 2016. These are direct valuations of TIPS valued securities made by market
12 participants, and reflect market participants' assessment of the risk-free rate as
13 measured by Treasury instruments in the current market.

14 These two alternative methods of measuring the risk-free rate provide strong
15 evidence that the current market risk-free rate is approximately 0.92%.

16 Using 50% of this real risk-free rate, or 0.46%, as proposed by Ms. Bulkley in
17 her direct testimony on page 9, produces an ROR-FVRB of 5.00%, as developed on
18 Exhibit MPG-21.

19 As developed on my Exhibit MPG-21, these adjustments will reduce
20 Ms. Bulkley's ROR-FVRB from 5.69% down to 5.00%.

21 **Q WITH THESE CORRECTIONS, HOW WOULD THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROI**
22 **BE IMPACTED AS SHOWN ON TEP SCHEDULE A-1?**

23 **A** As developed on my Exhibit MPG-1, the ROI proposed by TEP of \$165.898 million
24 would be reduced down to \$145.696 million.

1 Q DOES THIS CONCLUDE YOUR DIRECT TESTIMONY?

2 A Yes, it does.

Qualifications of Michael P. Gorman

1 **Q PLEASE STATE YOUR NAME AND BUSINESS ADDRESS.**

2 A Michael P. Gorman. My business address is 16690 Swingley Ridge Road, Suite 140,
3 Chesterfield, MO 63017.

4 **Q PLEASE STATE YOUR OCCUPATION.**

5 A I am a consultant in the field of public utility regulation and a Managing Principal with
6 the firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc. ("BAI"), energy, economic and regulatory
7 consultants.

8 **Q PLEASE SUMMARIZE YOUR EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND AND WORK
9 EXPERIENCE.**

10 A In 1983 I received a Bachelors of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from
11 Southern Illinois University, and in 1986, I received a Masters Degree in Business
12 Administration with a concentration in Finance from the University of Illinois at
13 Springfield. I have also completed several graduate level economics courses.

14 In August of 1983, I accepted an analyst position with the Illinois Commerce
15 Commission ("ICC"). In this position, I performed a variety of analyses for both formal
16 and informal investigations before the ICC, including: marginal cost of energy, central
17 dispatch, avoided cost of energy, annual system production costs, and working
18 capital. In October of 1986, I was promoted to the position of Senior Analyst. In this
19 position, I assumed the additional responsibilities of technical leader on projects, and
20 my areas of responsibility were expanded to include utility financial modeling and
21 financial analyses.

1 In 1987, I was promoted to Director of the Financial Analysis Department. In
2 this position, I was responsible for all financial analyses conducted by the Staff.
3 Among other things, I conducted analyses and sponsored testimony before the ICC
4 on rate of return, financial integrity, financial modeling and related issues. I also
5 supervised the development of all Staff analyses and testimony on these same
6 issues. In addition, I supervised the Staff's review and recommendations to the
7 Commission concerning utility plans to issue debt and equity securities.

8 In August of 1989, I accepted a position with Merrill-Lynch as a financial
9 consultant. After receiving all required securities licenses, I worked with individual
10 investors and small businesses in evaluating and selecting investments suitable to
11 their requirements.

12 In September of 1990, I accepted a position with Drazen-Brubaker &
13 Associates, Inc. ("DBA"). In April 1995, the firm of Brubaker & Associates, Inc. was
14 formed. It includes most of the former DBA principals and Staff. Since 1990, I have
15 performed various analyses and sponsored testimony on cost of capital, cost/benefits
16 of utility mergers and acquisitions, utility reorganizations, level of operating expenses
17 and rate base, cost of service studies, and analyses relating to industrial jobs and
18 economic development. I also participated in a study used to revise the financial
19 policy for the municipal utility in Kansas City, Kansas.

20 At BAI, I also have extensive experience working with large energy users to
21 distribute and critically evaluate responses to requests for proposals ("RFPs") for
22 electric, steam, and gas energy supply from competitive energy suppliers. These
23 analyses include the evaluation of gas supply and delivery charges, cogeneration
24 and/or combined cycle unit feasibility studies, and the evaluation of third-party
25 asset/supply management agreements. I have participated in rate cases on rate

1 design and class cost of service for electric, natural gas, water and wastewater
2 utilities. I have also analyzed commodity pricing indices and forward pricing methods
3 for third party supply agreements, and have also conducted regional electric market
4 price forecasts.

5 In addition to our main office in St. Louis, the firm also has branch offices in
6 Phoenix, Arizona and Corpus Christi, Texas.

7 **Q HAVE YOU EVER TESTIFIED BEFORE A REGULATORY BODY?**

8 **A** Yes. I have sponsored testimony on cost of capital, revenue requirements, cost of
9 service and other issues before the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and
10 numerous state regulatory commissions including: Arkansas, Arizona, California,
11 Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
12 Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
13 York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
14 Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and before
15 the provincial regulatory boards in Alberta and Nova Scotia, Canada. I have also
16 sponsored testimony before the Board of Public Utilities in Kansas City, Kansas;
17 presented rate setting position reports to the regulatory board of the municipal utility
18 in Austin, Texas, and Salt River Project, Arizona, on behalf of industrial customers;
19 and negotiated rate disputes for industrial customers of the Municipal Electric
20 Authority of Georgia in the LaGrange, Georgia district.

1 Q PLEASE DESCRIBE ANY PROFESSIONAL REGISTRATIONS OR
2 ORGANIZATIONS TO WHICH YOU BELONG.

3 A I earned the designation of Chartered Financial Analyst ("CFA") from the CFA
4 Institute. The CFA charter was awarded after successfully completing three
5 examinations which covered the subject areas of financial accounting, economics,
6 fixed income and equity valuation and professional and ethical conduct. I am a
7 member of the CFA Institute's Financial Analyst Society.

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Tucson Electric Power Company

Development of Gross Revenue Requirement Increase

\$ Thousands

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>ACC Jurisdiction</u>			<u>Reference</u>
		<u>Original Cost</u>	<u>RCND</u>	<u>Fair Value</u>	
1	Adjusted Rate Base	\$ 2,104,678	\$3,721,880	\$2,913,279	Schedule A-1
2	Adjusted Operating Income	\$ 98,848	\$ 98,848	\$ 98,848	Schedule A-1 (adjusted for interest synch)
3	Current Rate of Return	4.70%	2.66%	3.39%	Ln. 2 / Ln. 1
4	Required Operating Income	\$ 145,696	\$ 145,696	\$ 145,696	Ln. 7 x Ln. 1
5	Weighted Average Cost of Capital	6.74%	6.74%	6.74%	Exhibit MPG-2, Ln. 3
6	Fair Value Adjustment	<u>0.18%</u>	<u>-2.83%</u>	<u>-1.74%</u>	Ln. 7 - Ln. 5
7	Required Rate of Return	6.92%	3.91%	5.00%	Ln. 4 / Ln. 1; Exhibit MPG-21, Ln. 7
8	Operating Income Deficiency	\$ 46,849	\$ 46,849	\$ 46,849	Ln. 4 - Ln. 2
9	Gross Revenue Conversion Factor	1.6223	1.6223	1.6223	Schedule A-1
10	Increase in Gross Revenue Requirement	\$ 76,003	\$ 76,003	\$ 76,003	Ln. 8 x Ln. 9

Tucson Electric Power Company

Rate of Return (June 30, 2015)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Amount</u> (1)	<u>Weight</u> (2)	<u>Cost</u> (3)	<u>Weighted</u> <u>Cost</u> (4)
1	Long-Term Debt	\$ 1,521,156	51.31%	4.32%	2.22%
2	Common Equity	<u>\$ 1,443,610</u>	<u>48.69%</u>	<u>9.30%</u>	<u>4.53%</u>
3	Total	\$ 2,964,766	100.00%		6.74%

Source:
Schedule D-1.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Proxy Group

Line	Company	Credit Ratings ¹		2015 Common Equity Ratios		EEI Category
		S&P (1)	Moody's (2)	SNL ² (3)	Value Line ³ (4)	Regulated/Mostly Regulated ⁴ (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	BBB+	A3	53.3%	53.7%	Regulated
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	A-	A3	46.5%	49.5%	Regulated
3	Ameren Corporation	BBB+	Baa1	47.4%	49.7%	Regulated
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	BBB	Baa1	46.3%	50.0%	Regulated
5	Avista Corporation	BBB	Baa1	46.9%	50.0%	Regulated
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	A-	Baa1	28.3%	30.5%	Mostly Regulated
7	CMS Energy Corporation	BBB+	Baa2	29.3%	31.4%	Regulated
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	A-	A3	47.7%	51.5%	Regulated
9	DTE Energy Company	BBB+	A3	47.3%	50.0%	Regulated
10	El Paso Electric Company	BBB	Baa1	44.6%	47.3%	Regulated
11	Entergy Corporation	BBB	Baa3	39.5%	40.8%	Regulated
12	Eversource Energy	A	Baa1	50.0%	53.0%	Regulated
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	BBB-	Baa3	36.1%	39.5%	Mostly Regulated
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	BBB+	Baa2	46.5%	49.1%	Regulated
15	IDACORP, Inc.	BBB	Baa1	54.0%	54.4%	Regulated
16	NorthWestern Corporation	BBB	A3	44.0%	46.9%	Regulated
17	OGE Energy Corp.	A-	A3	54.8%	55.7%	Regulated
18	PG&E Corporation	BBB	Baa1	48.8%	50.4%	Regulated
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	A-	A3	53.7%	57.0%	Regulated
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	BBB+	Baa3	40.6%	45.6%	Regulated
21	Portland General Electric Company	BBB	A3	50.7%	52.2%	Regulated
22	PPL Corporation	A-	Baa2	33.2%	34.8%	Mostly Regulated
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	BBB+	Baa2	56.8%	59.5%	Mostly Regulated
24	SCANA Corporation	BBB+	Baa3	45.5%	47.5%	Mostly Regulated
25	Sempra Energy	BBB+	Baa1	43.3%	47.3%	Mostly Regulated
26	Vectren Corporation	A-	N/A	48.3%	49.4%	Mostly Regulated
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	A-	A3	45.4%	48.6%	Regulated
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	BBB+	Baa1	50.1%	49.0%	Regulated
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	A-	A3	43.3%	45.9%	Regulated
30	Average	BBB+	Baa1	45.6%	47.9%	Regulated
31	Tucson Electric Power Company	BBB+⁵	A3⁵		48.7%⁶	

Sources:

¹ SNL Financial, Long-term Issuer Ratings, Downloaded on May 13, 2016.² SNL Financial, Downloaded on May 13, 2016.³ The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.⁴ www.eei.org Edison Electric Institute, 2015 Q4 - Financial Updates.⁵ Bulkley direct at 20.⁶ Grant direct at 11.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates

Line	Company	Zacks		SNL		Reuters		Average of Growth Rates (7)
		Estimated Growth % ¹ (1)	Number of Estimates (2)	Estimated Growth % ² (3)	Number of Estimates (4)	Estimated Growth % ³ (5)	Number of Estimates (6)	
1	ALLETE, Inc.	4.50%	N/A	4.50%	2	3.00%	1	4.00%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	6.10%	N/A	6.80%	3	6.65%	2	6.52%
3	Ameren Corporation	6.70%	N/A	7.00%	2	7.10%	1	6.93%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	4.80%	N/A	3.50%	4	4.07%	3	4.12%
5	Avista Corporation	5.00%	N/A	5.00%	1	NA	NA	5.00%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	5.20%	N/A	4.10%	4	5.39%	4	4.90%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	6.40%	N/A	6.80%	4	7.24%	3	6.81%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	2.30%	N/A	2.80%	4	2.42%	4	2.51%
9	DTE Energy Company	5.80%	N/A	5.60%	5	5.35%	4	5.58%
10	El Paso Electric Company	6.70%	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA	NA	6.70%
11	Energy Corporation	- 2.30%	N/A	0.50%	3	- 2.37%	4	0.50%
12	Eversource Energy	6.30%	N/A	6.60%	4	6.01%	3	6.30%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	- 1.00%	N/A	0.40%	4	- 2.51%	4	0.40%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	6.60%	N/A	5.60%	4	7.10%	3	6.43%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	4.00%	N/A	N/A	N/A	NA	NA	4.00%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	5.00%	N/A	5.00%	3	5.00%	2	5.00%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	5.20%	N/A	5.50%	3	4.30%	2	5.00%
18	PG&E Corporation	4.40%	N/A	5.60%	3	6.02%	4	5.34%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	4.00%	N/A	4.30%	4	3.60%	3	3.97%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	7.60%	N/A	7.50%	3	8.76%	2	7.95%
21	Portland General Electric Company	6.40%	N/A	6.10%	4	6.50%	4	6.33%
22	PPL Corporation	4.60%	N/A	7.50%	5	4.23%	4	5.44%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	2.60%	N/A	2.30%	4	1.63%	4	2.18%
24	SCANA Corporation	5.30%	N/A	5.60%	1	4.80%	1	5.23%
25	Sempra Energy	8.00%	N/A	11.00%	2	7.81%	3	8.94%
26	Vectren Corporation	5.30%	N/A	5.00%	2	5.00%	2	5.10%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	6.30%	N/A	6.30%	3	6.77%	3	6.46%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	5.00%	N/A	4.90%	3	4.93%	3	4.94%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	5.20%	N/A	5.00%	4	5.27%	3	5.16%
30	Average	5.38%	N/A	5.21%	3	5.37%	3	5.09%

Sources:

¹ Zacks Elite, <http://www.zackselite.com/>, downloaded on May 13, 2016.

² SNL Interactive, <http://www.snl.com/>, downloaded on May 13, 2016.

³ Reuters, <http://www.reuters.com/>, downloaded on May 13, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Constant Growth DCF Model (Consensus Analysts' Growth Rates)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>13-Week AVG Stock Price¹</u> (1)	<u>Analysts' Growth²</u> (2)	<u>Annualized Dividend³</u> (3)	<u>Adjusted Yield</u> (4)	<u>Constant Growth DCF</u> (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$55.38	4.00%	\$2.08	3.91%	7.91%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$71.09	6.52%	\$2.35	3.52%	10.04%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$48.00	6.93%	\$1.70	3.79%	10.72%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$64.11	4.12%	\$2.24	3.64%	7.76%
5	Avista Corporation	\$39.54	5.00%	\$1.37	3.64%	8.64%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$20.45	4.90%	\$1.03	5.28%	10.18%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$40.84	6.81%	\$1.24	3.24%	10.06%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$73.61	2.51%	\$2.68	3.73%	6.24%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$87.84	5.58%	\$2.92	3.51%	9.09%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$43.73	6.70%	\$1.18	2.88%	9.58%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$75.72	0.50%	\$3.40	4.51%	5.01%
12	Eversource Energy	\$56.44	6.30%	\$1.78	3.35%	9.66%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$34.60	0.40%	\$1.44	4.18%	4.58%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$30.85	6.43%	\$1.05	3.62%	10.06%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$72.79	4.00%	\$2.04	2.91%	6.91%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$59.40	5.00%	\$2.00	3.54%	8.54%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$27.81	5.00%	\$1.10	4.15%	9.15%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$57.93	5.34%	\$1.82	3.31%	8.65%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$71.92	3.97%	\$2.50	3.61%	7.58%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$32.61	7.95%	\$0.88	2.91%	10.87%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$39.12	6.33%	\$1.20	3.26%	9.60%
22	PPL Corporation	\$36.94	5.44%	\$1.52	4.34%	9.78%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$45.18	2.18%	\$1.56	3.53%	5.70%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$67.84	5.23%	\$2.18	3.38%	8.61%
25	Sempra Energy	\$101.35	8.94%	\$3.02	3.25%	12.18%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$48.47	5.10%	\$1.60	3.47%	8.57%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.08	6.46%	\$1.98	3.63%	10.09%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$48.50	4.94%	\$1.52	3.29%	8.23%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$40.40	5.16%	\$1.36	3.54%	8.70%
30	Average	\$53.47	5.09%	\$1.82	3.62%	8.71%
31	Median					8.70%

Sources:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on May 16, 2016.² Exhibit MPG-4.³ The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Payout Ratios

<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Dividends Per Share</u>		<u>Earnings Per Share</u>		<u>Payout Ratio</u>	
		<u>2015</u>	<u>Projected</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>Projected</u>	<u>2015</u>	<u>Projected</u>
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$2.02	\$2.40	\$3.38	\$3.75	59.76%	64.00%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$2.20	\$3.00	\$3.37	\$4.70	65.28%	63.83%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$1.66	\$2.05	\$2.38	\$3.25	69.75%	63.08%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$2.15	\$2.75	\$3.60	\$4.25	59.72%	64.71%
5	Avista Corporation	\$1.32	\$1.60	\$1.89	\$2.50	69.84%	64.00%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$0.99	\$1.19	\$1.08	\$1.35	91.67%	88.15%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$1.16	\$1.60	\$1.89	\$2.50	61.38%	64.00%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$2.60	\$3.00	\$3.95	\$4.50	65.82%	66.67%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$2.84	\$3.70	\$4.44	\$5.75	63.96%	64.35%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$1.17	\$1.50	\$2.03	\$2.50	57.64%	60.00%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$3.34	\$4.00	\$6.00	\$6.75	55.67%	59.26%
12	Eversource Energy	\$1.67	\$2.20	\$2.76	\$3.75	60.51%	58.67%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$1.44	\$1.60	\$2.00	\$3.25	72.00%	49.23%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$1.00	\$1.30	\$1.37	\$2.00	72.99%	65.00%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$1.92	\$2.70	\$3.87	\$4.50	49.61%	60.00%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$1.92	\$2.32	\$2.90	\$4.00	66.21%	58.00%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$1.05	\$1.65	\$1.71	\$2.25	61.40%	73.33%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$1.82	\$2.35	\$2.00	\$4.50	91.00%	52.22%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$2.44	\$3.10	\$3.92	\$4.75	62.24%	65.26%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$0.80	\$1.30	\$1.64	\$2.35	48.78%	55.32%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$1.18	\$1.60	\$2.04	\$2.75	57.84%	58.18%
22	PPL Corporation	\$1.50	\$1.76	\$2.37	\$3.00	63.29%	58.67%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$1.56	\$2.00	\$3.15	\$3.50	49.52%	57.14%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$2.18	\$2.60	\$3.85	\$4.75	56.62%	54.74%
25	Sempra Energy	\$2.80	\$3.90	\$5.23	\$8.25	53.54%	47.27%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$1.54	\$1.95	\$2.39	\$3.40	64.44%	57.35%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$1.74	\$2.40	\$2.34	\$3.75	74.36%	64.00%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$1.44	\$1.84	\$2.09	\$3.10	68.90%	59.35%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$1.28	\$1.70	\$2.10	\$2.75	60.95%	61.82%
30	Average	\$1.75	\$2.24	\$2.82	\$3.74	63.96%	61.30%

Source:

The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Sustainable Growth Rate

Line	Company	3 to 5 Year Projections										Sustainable Growth Rate (11)
		Dividends Per Share (1)	Earnings Per Share (2)	Book Value Per Share (3)	Book Value Growth (4)	ROE (5)	Adjustment Factor (6)	Adjusted ROE (7)	Payout Ratio (8)	Retention Rate (9)	Internal Growth Rate (10)	
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$2.40	\$3.75	\$43.25	3.13%	8.67%	1.02	8.80%	64.00%	36.00%	3.17%	3.48%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$3.00	\$4.70	\$40.00	2.95%	11.75%	1.01	11.92%	63.83%	36.17%	4.31%	4.55%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$2.05	\$3.25	\$34.00	3.50%	9.56%	1.02	9.72%	63.08%	36.92%	3.59%	3.59%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$2.75	\$4.25	\$44.25	3.95%	9.60%	1.02	9.79%	64.71%	35.29%	3.46%	3.69%
5	Avista Corporation	\$1.60	\$2.50	\$28.50	3.05%	8.77%	1.01	8.90%	64.00%	36.00%	3.21%	3.79%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$1.19	\$1.35	\$9.50	3.37%	14.21%	1.02	14.45%	88.15%	11.85%	1.71%	3.11%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$1.60	\$2.50	\$19.25	6.26%	12.99%	1.03	13.38%	64.00%	36.00%	4.82%	5.91%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$3.00	\$4.50	\$52.25	3.38%	8.61%	1.02	8.76%	66.67%	33.33%	2.92%	2.92%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$3.70	\$5.75	\$60.25	4.31%	9.54%	1.02	9.74%	64.35%	35.65%	3.47%	3.88%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$1.50	\$2.50	\$29.50	3.26%	8.47%	1.02	8.61%	60.00%	40.00%	3.44%	3.61%
11	Energy Corporation	\$4.00	\$6.75	\$64.25	4.37%	10.51%	1.02	10.73%	59.26%	40.74%	4.37%	4.37%
12	Eversource Energy	\$2.20	\$3.75	\$38.75	3.58%	9.68%	1.02	9.85%	58.67%	41.33%	4.07%	4.26%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$1.60	\$3.25	\$37.50	4.46%	8.67%	1.02	8.86%	49.23%	50.77%	4.50%	4.58%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$1.30	\$2.00	\$27.50	3.04%	7.27%	1.01	7.38%	65.00%	35.00%	2.58%	2.63%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$2.70	\$4.50	\$49.75	4.01%	9.05%	1.02	9.22%	60.00%	40.00%	3.69%	3.76%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$2.32	\$4.00	\$39.50	3.52%	10.13%	1.02	10.30%	58.00%	42.00%	4.33%	4.69%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$1.65	\$2.25	\$19.75	3.47%	11.39%	1.02	11.59%	73.33%	26.67%	3.09%	3.23%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$2.35	\$4.50	\$44.25	5.60%	10.17%	1.03	10.45%	52.22%	47.78%	4.99%	5.77%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$3.10	\$4.75	\$48.75	3.37%	9.74%	1.02	9.91%	65.26%	34.74%	3.44%	3.72%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$1.30	\$2.35	\$25.50	4.20%	9.22%	1.02	9.41%	55.32%	44.68%	4.20%	4.24%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$1.60	\$2.75	\$31.00	4.04%	8.87%	1.02	9.05%	58.18%	41.82%	3.78%	3.78%
22	PPL Corporation	\$1.76	\$3.00	\$20.25	6.59%	14.81%	1.03	15.29%	58.67%	41.33%	6.32%	6.95%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$2.00	\$3.50	\$32.75	4.97%	10.69%	1.02	10.95%	57.14%	42.86%	4.69%	4.69%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$2.60	\$4.75	\$48.25	5.20%	9.84%	1.03	10.09%	54.74%	45.26%	5.22%	5.22%
25	Sempra Energy	\$3.90	\$8.25	\$61.25	5.19%	13.47%	1.03	13.81%	47.27%	52.73%	7.28%	8.04%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$1.95	\$3.40	\$26.75	5.63%	12.71%	1.03	13.06%	57.35%	42.65%	5.57%	6.45%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$2.40	\$3.75	\$32.75	3.62%	11.45%	1.02	11.65%	64.00%	36.00%	4.20%	4.20%
28	Wester Energy, Inc.	\$1.84	\$3.10	\$29.80	2.78%	10.40%	1.01	10.55%	59.35%	40.65%	4.29%	6.09%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$1.70	\$2.75	\$25.50	4.07%	10.78%	1.02	11.00%	61.82%	38.18%	4.20%	4.21%
30	Average	\$2.24	\$3.74	\$36.71	4.10%	10.38%	1.02	10.59%	61.30%	38.70%	4.08%	4.46%

Sources and Notes:
Cols. (1), (2) and (3): The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.
Col. (4): [Col. (3) / Page 2 Col. (2)] * (1/5) - 1.

Col. (5): Col. (2) / Col. (3).
Col. (6): [2 * (1 + Col. (4))] / (2 + Col. (4)).
Col. (7): Col. (6) * Col. (5).
Col. (8): Col. (1) / Col. (2).
Col. (9): 1 - Col. (6).
Col. (10): Col. (9) * Col. (7).
Col. (11): Col. (10) + Page 2 Col. (9).

Tucson Electric Power Company

Sustainable Growth Rate

Line	Company	13-Week Average Stock Price ¹ (1)	2015 Book Value Per Share ² (2)	Market to Book Ratio (3)	Common Shares Outstanding (in Millions) ² 2014 (4) 3.5 Years (5)	Growth (6)	S Factor ³ (7)	V Factor ⁴ (8)	S * V (9)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$55.38	\$37.07	1.49	49.10	51.00	0.63%	0.95%	0.31%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$71.09	\$34.59	2.06	113.46	115.00	0.22%	0.46%	0.24%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$48.00	\$28.63	1.68	242.63	242.63	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$84.11	\$36.45	1.76	491.00	500.00	0.30%	0.53%	0.23%
5	Avista Corporation	\$39.54	\$24.53	1.61	62.31	66.00	0.96%	1.55%	0.59%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$20.45	\$8.05	2.54	431.00	455.00	0.91%	2.30%	1.40%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$40.84	\$14.21	2.87	277.16	287.00	0.58%	1.58%	1.09%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$73.61	\$44.25	1.66	293.00	293.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$87.84	\$48.80	1.80	179.50	185.00	0.50%	0.91%	0.40%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$43.73	\$25.13	1.74	40.44	41.00	0.23%	0.40%	0.17%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$75.72	\$51.89	1.46	178.39	178.40	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
12	Eversource Energy	\$66.44	\$32.50	1.74	318.00	323.00	0.26%	0.45%	0.19%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$34.60	\$30.15	1.15	424.00	439.00	0.58%	0.67%	0.09%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$30.85	\$23.68	1.30	154.40	155.75	0.15%	0.19%	0.04%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$72.79	\$40.88	1.78	50.34	50.60	0.09%	0.15%	0.07%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$59.40	\$33.22	1.79	48.17	49.50	0.45%	0.81%	0.36%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$27.81	\$16.65	1.67	200.00	202.50	0.21%	0.35%	0.14%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$57.93	\$33.69	1.72	492.03	525.00	1.09%	1.87%	0.78%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$71.92	\$41.30	1.74	110.98	113.50	0.37%	0.65%	0.28%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$32.61	\$20.76	1.57	79.65	80.00	0.07%	0.11%	0.04%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$39.12	\$25.43	1.54	89.79	89.80	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
22	PPL Corporation	\$36.94	\$14.72	2.51	673.86	691.00	0.42%	1.05%	0.63%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$45.18	\$25.70	1.76	506.00	506.00	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$67.84	\$37.45	1.81	143.00	150.00	0.80%	1.45%	0.65%
25	Sempra Energy	\$101.35	\$47.56	2.13	248.30	258.50	0.67%	1.43%	0.76%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$48.47	\$20.34	2.38	82.80	86.00	0.63%	1.51%	0.88%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.08	\$27.42	2.12	315.68	315.70	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$48.50	\$25.98	1.87	141.35	160.00	2.09%	3.90%	1.81%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$40.40	\$20.89	1.93	507.54	508.00	0.02%	0.03%	0.01%
30	Average	\$53.47	\$30.07	1.83	239.44	246.44	0.42%	0.81%	0.39%

Sources and Notes:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on May 16, 2016.

² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

³ Expected Growth in the Number of Shares, Column (3) * Column (6).

⁴ Expected Profit of Stock Investment, [1 - 1 / Column (3)].

Tucson Electric Power Company

Constant Growth DCF Model (Sustainable Growth Rate)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>13-Week AVG Stock Price¹</u> (1)	<u>Sustainable Growth²</u> (2)	<u>Annualized Dividend³</u> (3)	<u>Adjusted Yield</u> (4)	<u>Constant Growth DCF</u> (5)
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$55.38	3.48%	\$2.08	3.89%	7.37%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$71.09	4.55%	\$2.35	3.46%	8.01%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$48.00	3.59%	\$1.70	3.67%	7.26%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$64.11	3.69%	\$2.24	3.62%	7.31%
5	Avista Corporation	\$39.54	3.79%	\$1.37	3.60%	7.39%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$20.45	3.11%	\$1.03	5.19%	8.30%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$40.84	5.91%	\$1.24	3.22%	9.13%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$73.61	2.92%	\$2.68	3.75%	6.67%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$87.84	3.88%	\$2.92	3.45%	7.33%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$43.73	3.61%	\$1.18	2.80%	6.41%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$75.72	4.37%	\$3.40	4.69%	9.06%
12	Eversource Energy	\$56.44	4.26%	\$1.78	3.29%	7.55%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$34.60	4.58%	\$1.44	4.35%	8.93%
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$30.85	2.63%	\$1.05	3.49%	6.12%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$72.79	3.76%	\$2.04	2.91%	6.66%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$59.40	4.69%	\$2.00	3.52%	8.21%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$27.81	3.23%	\$1.10	4.08%	7.31%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$57.93	5.77%	\$1.82	3.32%	9.10%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$71.92	3.72%	\$2.50	3.61%	7.32%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$32.61	4.24%	\$0.88	2.81%	7.06%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$39.12	3.78%	\$1.20	3.18%	6.97%
22	PPL Corporation	\$36.94	6.95%	\$1.52	4.40%	11.35%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$45.18	4.69%	\$1.56	3.61%	8.31%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$67.84	5.22%	\$2.18	3.38%	8.60%
25	Sempra Energy	\$101.35	8.04%	\$3.02	3.22%	11.26%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$48.47	6.45%	\$1.60	3.51%	9.96%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.08	4.20%	\$1.98	3.55%	7.75%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$48.50	6.09%	\$1.52	3.33%	9.42%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$40.40	4.21%	\$1.36	3.51%	7.72%
30	Average	\$53.47	4.46%	\$1.82	3.60%	8.06%
31	Median					7.72%

Sources:


¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on May 16, 2016.

² Exhibit MPG-7, page 1.

³ *The Value Line Investment Survey*, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Electricity Sales Are Linked to U.S. Economic Growth



Note:

1988 represents the base year. Graph depicts increases or decreases from the base year.

Sources:

U.S. Energy Information Administration
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis

Tucson Electric Power Company

Multi-Stage Growth DCF Model


Line	Company	13-Week AVG Stock Price ¹ (1)	Annualized Dividend ² (2)	First Stage Growth ³ (3)	Second Stage Growth					Third Stage Growth ⁴ (9)	Multi-Stage Growth DCF (10)
					Year 6 (4)	Year 7 (5)	Year 8 (6)	Year 9 (7)	Year 10 (8)		
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$55.38	\$2.08	4.00%	4.03%	4.07%	4.10%	4.13%	4.17%	4.20%	8.06%
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	\$71.09	\$2.35	6.52%	6.13%	5.74%	5.36%	4.97%	4.59%	4.20%	8.19%
3	Ameren Corporation	\$48.00	\$1.70	6.93%	6.48%	6.02%	5.57%	5.11%	4.66%	4.20%	8.58%
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$64.11	\$2.24	4.12%	4.14%	4.15%	4.16%	4.17%	4.19%	4.20%	7.82%
5	Avista Corporation	\$39.54	\$1.37	5.00%	4.87%	4.73%	4.60%	4.47%	4.33%	4.20%	8.00%
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	\$20.45	\$1.03	4.90%	4.78%	4.66%	4.55%	4.43%	4.32%	4.20%	9.68%
7	CMS Energy Corporation	\$40.84	\$1.24	6.81%	6.38%	5.94%	5.51%	5.07%	4.64%	4.20%	7.93%
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	\$73.61	\$2.68	2.51%	2.79%	3.07%	3.35%	3.64%	3.92%	4.20%	7.59%
9	DTE Energy Company	\$87.84	\$2.92	5.58%	5.35%	5.12%	4.89%	4.66%	4.43%	4.20%	7.98%
10	El Paso Electric Company	\$43.73	\$1.18	6.70%	6.28%	5.87%	5.45%	5.03%	4.62%	4.20%	7.50%
11	Entergy Corporation	\$75.72	\$3.40	0.50%	1.12%	1.73%	2.35%	2.97%	3.58%	4.20%	7.88%
12	Eversource Energy	\$56.44	\$1.78	6.30%	5.95%	5.60%	5.25%	4.90%	4.55%	4.20%	7.95%
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	\$34.60	\$1.44	0.40%	1.03%	1.67%	2.30%	2.93%	3.57%	4.20%	7.58%
14	Great Plains Energy, Inc.	\$30.85	\$1.05	6.43%	6.06%	5.69%	5.32%	4.94%	4.57%	4.20%	8.28%
15	IDACORP, Inc.	\$72.79	\$2.04	4.00%	4.03%	4.07%	4.10%	4.13%	4.17%	4.20%	7.07%
16	NorthWestern Corporation	\$59.40	\$2.00	5.00%	4.87%	4.73%	4.60%	4.47%	4.33%	4.20%	7.89%
17	OGE Energy Corp.	\$27.81	\$1.10	5.00%	4.87%	4.73%	4.60%	4.47%	4.33%	4.20%	8.53%
18	PG&E Corporation	\$57.93	\$1.82	5.34%	5.15%	4.96%	4.77%	4.58%	4.39%	4.20%	7.72%
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$71.92	\$2.50	3.97%	4.01%	4.04%	4.08%	4.12%	4.16%	4.20%	7.76%
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$32.61	\$0.88	7.95%	7.33%	6.70%	6.08%	5.45%	4.83%	4.20%	7.77%
21	Portland General Electric Company	\$39.12	\$1.20	6.33%	5.98%	5.62%	5.27%	4.91%	4.56%	4.20%	7.86%
22	PPL Corporation	\$36.94	\$1.52	5.44%	5.24%	5.03%	4.82%	4.61%	4.41%	4.20%	8.83%
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	\$45.18	\$1.56	2.18%	2.51%	2.85%	3.19%	3.53%	3.86%	4.20%	7.34%
24	SCANA Corporation	\$67.84	\$2.18	5.23%	5.06%	4.89%	4.72%	4.54%	4.37%	4.20%	7.77%
25	Sempra Energy	\$101.35	\$3.02	8.94%	8.15%	7.36%	6.57%	5.78%	4.99%	4.20%	8.37%
26	Vectren Corporation	\$48.47	\$1.60	5.10%	4.95%	4.80%	4.65%	4.50%	4.35%	4.20%	7.84%
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	\$58.08	\$1.98	6.46%	6.08%	5.70%	5.33%	4.95%	4.58%	4.20%	8.29%
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$48.50	\$1.52	4.94%	4.82%	4.70%	4.57%	4.45%	4.32%	4.20%	7.62%
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	\$40.40	\$1.36	5.16%	5.00%	4.84%	4.68%	4.52%	4.36%	4.20%	7.93%
30	Average	\$53.47	\$1.82	5.09%	4.95%	4.80%	4.65%	4.50%	4.35%	4.20%	7.99%
31	Median										7.89%

Sources:

¹ SNL Financial, Downloaded on May 16, 2016.² The Value Line Investment Survey, February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.³ Exhibit MPG-5.⁴ Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2016 at 14.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Common Stock Market/Book Ratio



Source:
 1980 - 2000: Mergent Public Utility Manual.
 2001 - 2015: AUS Utility Reports, various dates.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Equity Risk Premium - Treasury Bond

<u>Line</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Authorized Electric Returns¹</u> (1)	<u>30 yr. Treasury Bond Yield²</u> (2)	<u>Indicated Risk Premium</u> (3)	<u>Rolling 5 - Year Average</u> (4)	<u>Rolling 10 - Year Average</u> (5)
1	1986	13.93%	7.80%	6.13%		
2	1987	12.99%	8.58%	4.41%		
3	1988	12.79%	8.96%	3.83%		
4	1989	12.97%	8.45%	4.52%		
5	1990	12.70%	8.61%	4.09%	4.60%	
6	1991	12.55%	8.14%	4.41%	4.25%	
7	1992	12.09%	7.67%	4.42%	4.26%	
8	1993	11.41%	6.60%	4.81%	4.45%	
9	1994	11.34%	7.37%	3.97%	4.34%	
10	1995	11.55%	6.88%	4.67%	4.46%	4.53%
11	1996	11.39%	6.70%	4.69%	4.51%	4.38%
12	1997	11.40%	6.61%	4.79%	4.59%	4.42%
13	1998	11.66%	5.58%	6.08%	4.84%	4.65%
14	1999	10.77%	5.87%	4.90%	5.03%	4.68%
15	2000	11.43%	5.94%	5.49%	5.19%	4.82%
16	2001	11.09%	5.49%	5.60%	5.37%	4.94%
17	2002	11.16%	5.43%	5.73%	5.56%	5.07%
18	2003	10.97%	4.96%	6.01%	5.55%	5.19%
19	2004	10.75%	5.05%	5.70%	5.71%	5.37%
20	2005	10.54%	4.65%	5.89%	5.79%	5.49%
21	2006	10.36%	4.99%	5.37%	5.74%	5.56%
22	2007	10.36%	4.83%	5.53%	5.70%	5.63%
23	2008	10.46%	4.28%	6.18%	5.73%	5.64%
24	2009	10.48%	4.07%	6.41%	5.88%	5.79%
25	2010	10.24%	4.25%	5.99%	5.89%	5.84%
26	2011	10.07%	3.91%	6.16%	6.05%	5.90%
27	2012	10.01%	2.92%	7.09%	6.37%	6.03%
28	2013	9.79%	3.45%	6.34%	6.40%	6.07%
29	2014	9.76%	3.34%	6.42%	6.40%	6.14%
30	2015	9.58%	2.84%	6.74%	6.55%	6.22%
31	2016 ³	9.68%	2.72%	6.96%	6.71%	6.38%
32	Average	11.17%	5.71%	5.46%	5.40%	5.40%
33	Minimum				4.25%	4.38%
	Maximum				6.71%	6.38%

Sources:

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Calendar 2015. In 2010 forward, the Virginia cases, which are subject to an adjustment for certain generation assets up to 200 basis points, are excluded.

² St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/>.
The yields from 2002 to 2005 represent the 20-Year Treasury yields obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank.

³ The data includes the period Jan - Mar 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Equity Risk Premium - Utility Bond

<u>Line</u>	<u>Year</u>	<u>Authorized Electric Returns¹</u> (1)	<u>Average "A" Rated Utility Bond Yield²</u> (2)	<u>Indicated Risk Premium</u> (3)	<u>Rolling 5 - Year Average</u> (4)	<u>Rolling 10 - Year Average</u> (5)
1	1986	13.93%	9.58%	4.35%		
2	1987	12.99%	10.10%	2.89%		
3	1988	12.79%	10.49%	2.30%		
4	1989	12.97%	9.77%	3.20%		
5	1990	12.70%	9.86%	2.84%	3.12%	
6	1991	12.55%	9.36%	3.19%	2.88%	
7	1992	12.09%	8.69%	3.40%	2.99%	
8	1993	11.41%	7.59%	3.82%	3.29%	
9	1994	11.34%	8.31%	3.03%	3.26%	
10	1995	11.55%	7.89%	3.66%	3.42%	3.27%
11	1996	11.39%	7.75%	3.64%	3.51%	3.20%
12	1997	11.40%	7.60%	3.80%	3.59%	3.29%
13	1998	11.66%	7.04%	4.62%	3.75%	3.52%
14	1999	10.77%	7.62%	3.15%	3.77%	3.52%
15	2000	11.43%	8.24%	3.19%	3.68%	3.55%
16	2001	11.09%	7.76%	3.33%	3.62%	3.56%
17	2002	11.16%	7.37%	3.79%	3.61%	3.60%
18	2003	10.97%	6.58%	4.39%	3.57%	3.66%
19	2004	10.75%	6.16%	4.59%	3.86%	3.81%
20	2005	10.54%	5.65%	4.89%	4.20%	3.94%
21	2006	10.36%	6.07%	4.29%	4.39%	4.00%
22	2007	10.36%	6.07%	4.29%	4.49%	4.05%
23	2008	10.46%	6.53%	3.93%	4.40%	3.98%
24	2009	10.48%	6.04%	4.44%	4.37%	4.11%
25	2010	10.24%	5.46%	4.78%	4.35%	4.27%
26	2011	10.07%	5.04%	5.03%	4.49%	4.44%
27	2012	10.01%	4.13%	5.88%	4.81%	4.65%
28	2013	9.79%	4.48%	5.31%	5.09%	4.74%
29	2014	9.76%	4.28%	5.48%	5.30%	4.83%
30	2015	9.58%	4.12%	5.46%	5.43%	4.89%
31	2016 ³	9.68%	4.18%	5.50%	5.53%	5.01%
32	Average	11.17%	7.09%	4.08%	4.03%	4.00%
33	Minimum				2.88%	3.20%
34	Maximum				5.53%	5.01%

Sources:

¹ Regulatory Research Associates, Inc., Regulatory Focus, Major Rate Case Decisions, Calendar 2015. In 2010 forward, the Virginia cases, which are subject to an adjustment for certain generation assets up to 200 basis points, are excluded.

² Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003. The utility yields for the period 2001-2009 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record. The utility yields from 2010-2015 were obtained from <http://credittrends.moody.com/>.


³ The data includes the period Jan - Mar 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Bond Yield Spreads

Line	Year	T-Bond Yield ¹ (1)	Public Utility Bond				Corporate Bond				Utility to Corporate	
			A ² (2)	Baa ² (3)	A-T-Bond Spread (4)	Baa-T-Bond Spread (5)	Aaa ¹ (6)	Baa ¹ (7)	Aaa-T-Bond Spread (8)	Baa-T-Bond Spread (9)	Baa Spread (10)	A-Aaa Spread (11)
1	1980	11.30%	13.34%	13.95%	2.04%	2.65%	11.94%	13.67%	0.64%	2.37%	0.28%	1.40%
2	1981	13.44%	15.95%	16.60%	2.51%	3.16%	14.17%	16.04%	0.73%	2.60%	0.56%	1.78%
3	1982	12.76%	15.86%	16.45%	3.10%	3.69%	13.79%	16.11%	1.03%	3.35%	0.34%	2.07%
4	1983	11.18%	13.66%	14.20%	2.48%	3.02%	12.04%	13.55%	0.86%	2.38%	0.65%	1.62%
5	1984	12.39%	14.03%	14.53%	1.64%	2.14%	12.71%	14.19%	0.32%	1.80%	0.34%	1.32%
6	1985	10.79%	12.47%	12.96%	1.68%	2.17%	11.37%	12.72%	0.58%	1.93%	0.24%	1.10%
7	1986	7.80%	9.58%	10.00%	1.78%	2.20%	9.02%	10.39%	1.22%	2.59%	-0.39%	0.56%
8	1987	8.58%	10.10%	10.53%	1.52%	1.95%	9.38%	10.58%	0.80%	2.00%	-0.05%	0.72%
9	1988	8.96%	10.49%	11.00%	1.53%	2.04%	9.71%	10.83%	0.75%	1.87%	0.17%	0.78%
10	1989	8.45%	9.77%	9.97%	1.32%	1.52%	9.26%	10.18%	0.81%	1.73%	-0.21%	0.51%
11	1990	8.61%	9.86%	10.06%	1.25%	1.45%	9.32%	10.36%	0.71%	1.75%	-0.29%	0.54%
12	1991	8.14%	9.36%	9.55%	1.22%	1.41%	8.77%	9.80%	0.63%	1.67%	-0.25%	0.59%
13	1992	7.67%	8.69%	8.86%	1.02%	1.19%	8.14%	8.98%	0.47%	1.31%	-0.12%	0.55%
14	1993	6.60%	7.59%	7.91%	0.99%	1.31%	7.22%	7.93%	0.62%	1.33%	-0.02%	0.37%
15	1994	7.37%	8.31%	8.63%	0.94%	1.26%	7.96%	8.62%	0.59%	1.25%	0.01%	0.35%
16	1995	6.88%	7.89%	8.29%	1.01%	1.41%	7.59%	8.20%	0.71%	1.32%	0.09%	0.30%
17	1996	6.70%	7.75%	8.17%	1.05%	1.47%	7.37%	8.05%	0.67%	1.35%	0.12%	0.38%
18	1997	6.61%	7.60%	7.95%	0.99%	1.34%	7.26%	7.86%	0.66%	1.26%	0.09%	0.34%
19	1998	5.58%	7.04%	7.26%	1.46%	1.68%	6.53%	7.22%	0.95%	1.64%	0.04%	0.51%
20	1999	5.87%	7.62%	7.88%	1.75%	2.01%	7.04%	7.87%	1.18%	2.01%	0.01%	0.58%
21	2000	5.94%	8.24%	8.36%	2.30%	2.42%	7.62%	8.36%	1.68%	2.42%	-0.01%	0.62%
22	2001	5.49%	7.76%	8.03%	2.27%	2.54%	7.08%	7.95%	1.59%	2.45%	0.08%	0.68%
23	2002	5.43%	7.37%	8.02%	1.94%	2.59%	6.49%	7.80%	1.06%	2.37%	0.22%	0.88%
24	2003	4.96%	6.58%	6.84%	1.62%	1.89%	5.67%	6.77%	0.71%	1.81%	0.08%	0.91%
25	2004	5.05%	6.16%	6.40%	1.11%	1.35%	5.63%	6.39%	0.58%	1.35%	0.00%	0.53%
26	2005	4.65%	5.65%	5.93%	1.00%	1.28%	5.24%	6.06%	0.59%	1.42%	-0.14%	0.41%
27	2006	4.99%	6.07%	6.32%	1.08%	1.32%	5.59%	6.48%	0.60%	1.49%	-0.16%	0.48%
28	2007	4.83%	6.07%	6.33%	1.24%	1.50%	5.56%	6.48%	0.72%	1.65%	-0.15%	0.52%
29	2008	4.28%	6.53%	7.25%	2.25%	2.97%	5.63%	7.45%	1.35%	3.17%	-0.20%	0.90%
30	2009	4.07%	6.04%	7.06%	1.97%	2.99%	5.31%	7.30%	1.24%	3.23%	-0.24%	0.72%
31	2010	4.25%	5.46%	5.96%	1.21%	1.71%	4.94%	6.04%	0.69%	1.79%	-0.08%	0.52%
32	2011	3.91%	5.04%	5.56%	1.13%	1.65%	4.64%	5.66%	0.73%	1.75%	-0.10%	0.40%
33	2012	2.92%	4.13%	4.83%	1.21%	1.91%	3.67%	4.94%	0.75%	2.01%	-0.11%	0.46%
34	2013	3.45%	4.48%	4.98%	1.03%	1.53%	4.24%	5.10%	0.79%	1.65%	-0.12%	0.24%
35	2014	3.34%	4.28%	4.80%	0.94%	1.46%	4.16%	4.85%	0.82%	1.51%	-0.06%	0.11%
36	2015	2.84%	4.12%	5.03%	1.27%	2.19%	3.89%	5.00%	1.05%	2.16%	0.03%	0.23%
37	2016 ³	2.72%	4.18%	5.30%	1.46%	2.58%	3.93%	5.31%	1.21%	2.59%	-0.01%	0.25%
37	Average	6.72%	8.25%	8.70%	1.52%	1.97%	7.56%	8.68%	0.84%	1.95%	0.02%	0.68%

Yield Spreads
Treasury Vs. Corporate & Treasury Vs. Utility



Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/>.

² Mergent Public Utility Manual, Mergent Weekly News Reports, 2003. The utility yields for the period 2001-2009 were obtained from the Mergent Bond Record. The utility yields from 2010-2015 were obtained from <http://credittrends.moodys.com/>.

³ The data includes the period Jan - Mar 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Treasury and Utility Bond Yields

<u>Line</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Treasury Bond Yield¹</u> (1)	<u>"A" Rated Utility Bond Yield²</u> (2)	<u>"Baa" Rated Utility Bond Yield²</u> (3)
1	05/13/16	2.55%	3.85%	4.51%
2	05/06/16	2.62%	3.93%	4.58%
3	04/29/16	2.66%	3.99%	4.66%
4	04/22/16	2.70%	4.05%	4.74%
5	04/15/16	2.56%	3.94%	4.70%
6	04/08/16	2.55%	3.96%	4.74%
7	04/01/16	2.62%	4.04%	4.87%
8	03/24/16	2.67%	4.11%	4.98%
9	03/18/16	2.68%	4.15%	5.05%
10	03/11/16	2.75%	4.23%	5.22%
11	03/04/16	2.70%	4.20%	5.28%
12	02/26/16	2.63%	4.15%	5.25%
13	02/19/16	2.61%	4.10%	5.26%
14	Average	2.64%	4.05%	4.91%
15	Spread To Treasury		1.41%	2.27%


Sources:

¹ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org>.

² <http://credittrends.moody.com/>.

Tucson Electric Power Company


Trends in Bond Yields



Sources:
Mergent Bond Record.
www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.
St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/>

Tucson Electric Power Company

Yield Spread Between Utility Bonds and 30-Year Treasury Bonds



Sources:
Mergent Bond Record.
www.moodys.com, Bond Yields and Key Indicators.
St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org/>

Tucson Electric Power Company

Value Line Beta

<u>Line</u>	<u>Company</u>	<u>Beta</u>
1	ALLETE, Inc.	0.80
2	Alliant Energy Corporation	0.80
3	Ameren Corporation	0.75
4	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	0.70
5	Avista Corporation	0.75
6	CenterPoint Energy, Inc.	0.85
7	CMS Energy Corporation	0.75
8	Consolidated Edison, Inc.	0.55
9	DTE Energy Company	0.75
10	El Paso Electric Company	0.75
11	Entergy Corporation	0.70
12	Eversource Energy	0.75
13	FirstEnergy Corp.	0.65
14	Great Plains Energy Inc.	0.80
15	IDACORP, Inc.	0.80
16	NorthWestern Corporation	0.70
17	OGE Energy Corp.	0.95
18	PG&E Corporation	0.70
19	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	0.75
20	PNM Resources, Inc.	0.80
21	Portland General Electric Company	0.80
22	PPL Corporation	0.70
23	Public Service Enterprise Group Incorporated	0.75
24	SCANA Corporation	0.75
25	Sempra Energy	0.85
26	Vectren Corporation	0.80
27	WEC Energy Group, Inc.	0.70
28	Westar Energy, Inc.	0.75
29	Xcel Energy Inc.	0.65
30	Average	0.75

Source:

The Value Line Investment Survey,
February 19, March 18, and April 29, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

CAPM Return

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	High Market Risk <u>Premium</u> (1)	Low Market Risk <u>Premium</u> (2)
1	Risk-Free Rate ¹	3.50%	3.50%
2	Risk Premium ²	7.90%	6.00%
3	Beta ³	0.75	0.75
4	CAPM	9.44%	8.01%

Sources:

¹ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts; May 1, 2016, at 2.

² Morningstar, Inc. Ibbotson S&P 2015 Classic Yearbook at 91 and 152.

³ Exhibit MPG-16.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics

Line	Description	Retail	S&P Benchmark (Medial Volatility) ^{1/2}			Reference
		Cost of Service	Intermediate	Significant	Aggressive	
		Amount (\$000)				
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
1	Rate Base	\$ 2,104,678				Schedule B-2 and G-2.
2	Weighted Common Return	4.53%				Page 2, Line 2, Col. 4.
3	Pre-Tax Rate of Return	9.56%				Page 2, Line 3, Col. 5.
4	Income to Common	\$ 95,308				Line 1 x Line 2.
5	EBIT	\$ 201,268				Line 1 x Line 3.
6	Depreciation & Amortization	\$ 129,703				Schedule G-2
7	Imputed Amortization	\$ 1,035				S&P Credit Portal, downloaded on May 25, 2016.
8	Deferred Income Taxes & ITC	\$ (58,309)				Schedule B-2 and G-2.
9	Funds from Operations (FFO)	\$ 167,737				Sum of Line 4 and Lines 6 through 8.
10	Imputed Interest Expense	\$ 667				S&P Credit Portal, downloaded on May 25, 2016.
11	EBITDA	\$ 332,673				Sum of Lines 5 through 7 and Line 10.
12	Total Debt Ratio	51%				Page 3, Line 3, Col. 2.
13	Debt to EBITDA	3.3x	2.5x - 3.5x	3.5x - 4.5x	4.5x - 5.5x	(Line 1 x Line 12) / Line 11.
14	FFO to Total Debt	15%	23% - 35%	13% - 23%	9% - 13%	Line 9 / (Line 1 x Line 12).

Sources:

¹ Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Criteria: Corporate Methodology," November 19, 2013.

² Standard & Poor's RatingsDirect: "Research Update: Tucson Electric Power Co. Outlook Revised To Negative, Ratings Affirmed On Parent's Planned Acquisition," February 10, 2016.

Note:

Based on the February 2016 S&P report, TEP has a "Strong" business risk profile and a "Significant" financial risk profile, and falls under the "Medial Volatility" matrix.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics (Pre-Tax Rate of Return)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Amount (000)</u> (1)	<u>Weight</u> (2)	<u>Cost</u> (3)	<u>Weighted Cost</u> (4)	<u>Pre-Tax Weighted Cost</u> (5)
1	Long-Term Debt	\$ 1,521,156	51.31%	4.32%	2.22%	2.22%
2	Common Equity	<u>1,443,610</u>	<u>48.69%</u>	<u>9.30%</u>	<u>4.53%</u>	<u>7.35%</u>
3	Total	\$ 2,964,766	100.00%		6.74%	9.56%
4	Tax Conversion Factor*					1.6223

Sources:
Exhibit MPG-2.
* Schedule A-1.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Standard & Poor's Credit Metrics (Financial Capital Structure)

<u>Line</u>	<u>Description</u>	<u>Amount (000)</u> (1)	<u>Weight</u> (2)
1	Long-Term Debt	\$ 1,521,156	51.15%
2	Operating Leases*	<u>8,857</u>	<u>0.30%</u>
3	Total Debt	\$ 1,530,013	51.45%
4	Common Equity	<u>\$ 1,443,610</u>	<u>48.55%</u>
5	Total	\$ 2,973,623	100.00%

Source:

* S&P Credit Portal, downloaded on May 25, 2016.

Includes 78.5% of the total company operating leases based on the rate base allocator.

Tucson Electric Power Company

S&P CreditStats

<u>Line</u>		<u>Credit Rating</u>	<u>FFO / Debt (%)</u>	<u>Debt / Capital (%)</u>
		(1)	(2)	(3)

Value Line Publicly Traded Electric Utility Companies

A Rated

1	Average	A-	25.17	55.50
2	Median	A-	26.02	54.03

BBB Rated

3	Average	BBB	21.30	56.64
4	Median	BBB	21.72	56.75

All Utilities

5	Average	BBB+	22.62	56.25
6	Median	BBB+	23.89	56.14

Electric Operating Subsidiary Companies

A Rated

7	Average	A-	20.74	51.52
8	Median	A-	19.54	52.00

BBB Rated

9	Average	BBB	20.46	54.25
10	Median	BBB	18.03	54.13

All Utilities

11	Average	BBB+	20.59	52.92
12	Median	BBB+	19.01	53.47

Source:

www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/
Downloaded May 31, 2016.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Bulkey Revised 30-Day Multi-Stage DCF Average First Stage Growth Rate

Line	Company	Stock Price ¹ (1)	Annualized Dividend ¹ (2)	First Stage Growth ¹ (3)	Second Stage Growth					Third Stage Growth ² (9)	ROE (10)
					Year 5 (4)	Year 7 (5)	Year 8 (6)	Year 9 (7)	Year 10 (8)		
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$47.54	\$2.02	6.25%	5.91%	5.57%	5.23%	4.88%	4.54%	4.20%	9.44%
2	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$54.84	\$2.12	4.97%	4.84%	4.71%	4.59%	4.46%	4.33%	4.20%	8.60%
3	Duke Energy Corporation	\$72.86	\$3.18	4.78%	4.68%	4.59%	4.49%	4.39%	4.30%	4.20%	9.12%
4	Empire District Electric Company	\$22.30	\$1.04	4.33%	4.31%	4.29%	4.27%	4.24%	4.22%	4.20%	9.32%
5	Eversource Energy	\$47.07	\$1.67	7.22%	6.72%	6.21%	5.71%	5.21%	4.70%	4.20%	8.84%
6	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$25.06	\$0.98	5.79%	5.53%	5.28%	5.00%	4.73%	4.47%	4.20%	8.89%
7	IDACORP, Inc.	\$58.15	\$1.88	3.00%	3.20%	3.40%	3.60%	3.80%	4.00%	4.20%	7.42%
8	Otter Tail Corporation	\$26.71	\$1.23	7.50%	6.95%	6.40%	5.85%	5.30%	4.75%	4.20%	10.33%
9	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$59.37	\$2.38	4.63%	4.56%	4.49%	4.42%	4.34%	4.27%	4.20%	8.67%
10	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$25.48	\$0.80	8.52%	7.80%	7.08%	6.36%	5.64%	4.92%	4.20%	8.65%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$34.21	\$1.20	5.32%	5.13%	4.95%	4.76%	4.57%	4.39%	4.20%	8.27%
12	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$35.72	\$1.44	4.30%	4.28%	4.27%	4.25%	4.23%	4.22%	4.20%	8.60%
13	Average	\$42.44	\$1.66	5.55%	5.33%	5.10%	4.88%	4.65%	4.43%	4.20%	8.84%
14	Median										8.76%

Sources:

¹ Exhibit AEB-2, page 1.

² Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2016 at 14.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Bulkley Revised 90-Day Multi-Stage DCF Average First Stage Growth Rate

Line	Company	Stock Price ¹ (1)	Annualized Dividend ¹ (2)	First Stage Growth ¹ (3)	Second Stage Growth					Third Stage Growth ² (9)	ROE (10)
					Year 6 (4)	Year 7 (5)	Year 8 (6)	Year 9 (7)	Year 10 (8)		
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$49.34	\$2.02	6.25%	5.91%	5.57%	5.23%	4.88%	4.54%	4.20%	9.25%
2	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$55.40	\$2.12	4.97%	4.84%	4.71%	4.59%	4.46%	4.33%	4.20%	8.55%
3	Duke Energy Corporation	\$75.02	\$3.18	4.78%	4.68%	4.59%	4.49%	4.39%	4.30%	4.20%	8.97%
4	Empire District Electric Company	\$23.28	\$1.04	4.33%	4.31%	4.29%	4.27%	4.24%	4.22%	4.20%	9.09%
5	Eversource Energy	\$48.34	\$1.67	7.22%	6.72%	6.21%	5.71%	5.21%	4.70%	4.20%	8.72%
6	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$25.73	\$0.98	5.79%	5.53%	5.26%	5.00%	4.73%	4.47%	4.20%	8.76%
7	IDACORP, Inc.	\$59.46	\$1.88	3.00%	3.20%	3.40%	3.60%	3.80%	4.00%	4.20%	7.34%
8	Otter Tail Corporation	\$28.39	\$1.23	7.50%	6.95%	6.40%	5.85%	5.30%	4.75%	4.20%	9.97%
9	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$60.43	\$2.38	4.63%	4.56%	4.49%	4.42%	4.34%	4.27%	4.20%	8.59%
10	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$26.58	\$0.80	8.52%	7.80%	7.08%	6.36%	5.64%	4.92%	4.20%	8.47%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$35.00	\$1.20	5.32%	5.13%	4.95%	4.76%	4.57%	4.39%	4.20%	8.18%
12	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$36.55	\$1.44	4.30%	4.28%	4.27%	4.25%	4.23%	4.22%	4.20%	8.50%
13	Average	\$43.63	\$1.66	5.55%	5.33%	5.10%	4.88%	4.65%	4.43%	4.20%	8.70%
14	Median										8.65%

Sources:

¹ Exhibit AEB-2, page 2.

² Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2016 at 14.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Bulkley Revised 180-Day Multi-Stage DCF Average First Stage Growth Rate

Line	Company	Stock Price ¹ (1)	Annualized Dividend ¹ (2)	First Stage Growth ¹ (3)	Second Stage Growth					Third Stage Growth ² (9)	ROE (10)
					Year 5 (4)	Year 7 (5)	Year 8 (6)	Year 9 (7)	Year 10 (8)		
1	ALLETE, Inc.	\$51.76	\$2.02	6.25%	5.91%	5.57%	5.23%	4.88%	4.54%	4.20%	9.01%
2	American Electric Power Company, Inc.	\$57.32	\$2.12	4.97%	4.84%	4.71%	4.59%	4.46%	4.33%	4.20%	8.40%
3	Duke Energy Corporation	\$78.37	\$3.18	4.78%	4.68%	4.59%	4.49%	4.39%	4.30%	4.20%	8.77%
4	Empire District Electric Company	\$25.56	\$1.04	4.33%	4.31%	4.29%	4.27%	4.24%	4.22%	4.20%	8.65%
5	Eversource Energy	\$50.34	\$1.67	7.22%	6.72%	6.21%	5.71%	5.21%	4.70%	4.20%	8.54%
6	Great Plains Energy Inc.	\$26.61	\$0.98	5.79%	5.53%	5.26%	5.00%	4.73%	4.47%	4.20%	8.61%
7	IDACORP, Inc.	\$61.81	\$1.88	3.00%	3.20%	3.40%	3.60%	3.80%	4.00%	4.20%	7.22%
8	Otter Tail Corporation	\$29.73	\$1.23	7.50%	6.95%	6.40%	5.85%	5.30%	4.75%	4.20%	9.71%
9	Pinnacle West Capital Corporation	\$63.37	\$2.38	4.63%	4.56%	4.49%	4.42%	4.34%	4.27%	4.20%	8.38%
10	PNM Resources, Inc.	\$27.87	\$0.80	8.52%	7.80%	7.08%	6.36%	5.64%	4.92%	4.20%	8.27%
11	Portland General Electric Company	\$36.33	\$1.20	5.32%	5.13%	4.95%	4.76%	4.57%	4.39%	4.20%	8.03%
12	Westar Energy, Inc.	\$38.34	\$1.44	4.30%	4.28%	4.27%	4.25%	4.23%	4.22%	4.20%	8.29%
13	Average	\$45.62	\$1.66	5.55%	5.33%	5.10%	4.88%	4.65%	4.43%	4.20%	8.49%
14	Median										8.47%

Sources:

¹ Exhibit AEB-2, page 3.

² Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2016 at 14.

Tucson Electric Power Company

Accuracy of Interest Rate Forecasts
(Long-Term Treasury Bond Yields - Projected Vs. Actual)

Line	Date	Publication Data			Actual Yield in Projected Quarter	Projected Yield Higher (Lower) Than Actual Yield*
		Prior Quarter Actual Yield (1)	Projected Yield (2)	Projected Quarter (3)		
1	Dec-00	5.8%	5.8%	1Q, 02	5.6%	0.2%
2	Mar-01	5.7%	5.6%	2Q, 02	5.8%	-0.2%
3	Jun-01	5.4%	5.8%	3Q, 02	5.2%	0.6%
4	Sep-01	5.7%	5.9%	4Q, 02	5.1%	0.8%
5	Dec-01	5.5%	5.7%	1Q, 03	5.0%	0.7%
6	Mar-02	5.3%	5.9%	2Q, 03	4.7%	1.2%
7	Jun-02	5.6%	6.2%	3Q, 03	5.2%	1.0%
8	Sep-02	5.8%	5.9%	4Q, 03	5.2%	0.7%
9	Dec-02	5.2%	5.7%	1Q, 04	4.9%	0.8%
10	Mar-03	5.1%	5.7%	2Q, 04	5.4%	0.3%
11	Jun-03	5.0%	5.4%	3Q, 04	5.1%	0.3%
12	Sep-03	4.7%	5.8%	4Q, 04	4.9%	0.9%
13	Dec-03	5.2%	5.9%	1Q, 05	4.8%	1.1%
14	Mar-04	5.2%	5.9%	2Q, 05	4.6%	1.4%
15	Jun-04	4.9%	6.2%	3Q, 05	4.5%	1.7%
16	Sep-04	5.4%	6.0%	4Q, 05	4.8%	1.2%
17	Dec-04	5.1%	5.8%	1Q, 06	4.6%	1.2%
18	Mar-05	4.9%	5.6%	2Q, 06	5.1%	0.5%
19	Jun-05	4.8%	5.5%	3Q, 06	5.0%	0.5%
20	Sep-05	4.6%	5.2%	4Q, 06	4.7%	0.5%
21	Dec-05	4.5%	5.3%	1Q, 07	4.8%	0.5%
22	Mar-06	4.8%	5.1%	2Q, 07	5.0%	0.1%
23	Jun-06	4.6%	5.3%	3Q, 07	4.9%	0.4%
24	Sep-06	5.1%	5.2%	4Q, 07	4.6%	0.6%
25	Dec-06	5.0%	5.0%	1Q, 08	4.4%	0.6%
26	Mar-07	4.7%	5.1%	2Q, 08	4.6%	0.5%
27	Jun-07	4.8%	5.1%	3Q, 08	4.5%	0.7%
28	Sep-07	5.0%	5.2%	4Q, 08	3.7%	1.5%
29	Dec-07	4.9%	4.8%	1Q, 09	3.5%	1.4%
30	Mar-08	4.6%	4.8%	2Q, 09	4.0%	0.8%
31	Jun-08	4.4%	4.9%	3Q, 09	4.3%	0.6%
32	Sep-08	4.6%	5.1%	4Q, 09	4.3%	0.8%
33	Dec-08	4.5%	4.6%	1Q, 10	4.6%	0.0%
34	Mar-09	3.7%	4.1%	2Q, 10	4.4%	-0.3%
35	Jun-09	3.5%	4.6%	3Q, 10	3.9%	0.8%
36	Sep-09	4.0%	5.0%	4Q, 10	4.2%	0.8%
37	Dec-09	4.3%	5.0%	1Q, 11	4.6%	0.4%
38	Mar-10	4.3%	5.2%	2Q, 11	4.3%	0.9%
39	Jun-10	4.6%	5.2%	3Q, 11	3.7%	1.5%
40	Sep-10	4.4%	4.7%	4Q, 11	3.0%	1.7%
41	Dec-10	3.9%	4.6%	1Q, 12	3.1%	1.5%
42	Mar-11	4.2%	5.1%	2Q, 12	2.9%	2.2%
43	Jun-11	4.6%	5.2%	3Q, 12	2.8%	2.5%
44	Sep-11	4.3%	4.2%	4Q, 12	2.9%	1.3%
45	Dec-11	3.7%	3.8%	1Q, 13	3.1%	0.7%
46	Mar-12	3.0%	3.8%	2Q, 13	3.2%	0.7%
47	Jun-12	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 13	3.7%	0.0%
48	Sep-12	2.9%	3.4%	4Q, 13	3.8%	-0.4%
49	Dec-12	2.8%	3.4%	1Q, 14	3.7%	-0.3%
50	Mar-13	2.9%	3.6%	2Q, 14	3.4%	0.2%
51	Jun-13	3.1%	3.7%	3Q, 14	3.3%	0.4%
52	Sep-13	3.2%	4.2%	4Q, 14	3.0%	1.2%
53	Dec-13	3.7%	4.2%	1Q, 15	2.6%	1.7%
54	Mar-14	3.8%	4.4%	2Q, 15	2.9%	1.5%
55	Jun-14	3.7%	4.3%	3Q, 15	2.8%	1.5%
56	Sep-14	3.4%	4.3%	4Q, 15	3.0%	1.3%
57	Dec-14	3.3%	4.0%	1Q, 16	2.7%	1.3%
58	Jan-15	3.0%	4.0%	2Q, 16		
59	Feb-15	3.0%	3.7%	2Q, 16		
60	Mar-15	3.0%	3.7%	2Q, 16		
61	Apr-15	2.6%	3.7%	3Q, 16		
62	May-15	2.6%	3.7%	3Q, 16		
63	Jun-15	2.6%	3.7%	3Q, 16		
64	Jul-15	2.7%	4.0%	4Q, 16		
65	Aug-15	2.9%	3.9%	4Q, 16		
66	Sep-15	2.9%	3.8%	4Q, 16		
67	Oct-15	2.8%	3.9%	1Q, 17		
68	Nov-15	2.8%	3.8%	1Q, 17		
69	Dec-15	2.8%	3.7%	1Q, 17		
70	Jan-16	3.0%	3.8%	2Q, 17		
71	Feb-16	3.0%	3.7%	2Q, 17		
72	Mar-16	3.0%	3.5%	2Q, 17		
73	Apr-16	2.7%	3.6%	3Q, 17		
74	May-16	2.7%	3.5%	3Q, 17		

Source:
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, Various Dates.
* Col. 2 - Col. 4.

Tucson Electric Power Company**Fair Value Rate Base & Rate of Return**

<u>Line</u>	<u>Capital</u>	<u>\$ Millions</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Weighted FVRB</u>	
1	OCRB	\$ 2,104.7	50.00%	\$ 1,052.4	
2	RCND	\$ 3,721.9	50.00%	\$ 1,861.0	
3	FVRB			<u>\$ 2,913.3</u>	
	<u>Capital</u>	<u>\$ Millions</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Cost Rate</u>	<u>Weighted Cost Rate</u>
4	Long-Term Debt	\$ 1,079.9	37.07%	4.32%	1.60%
5	Common Equity	\$ 1,024.8	35.18%	9.30%	3.27%
6	Fair Value Increment	<u>\$ 808.6</u>	27.76%	0.46%	<u>0.13%</u>
7	Total	<u>\$ 2,913.3</u>			5.00%

Tucson Electric Power Company

Development of the Fair Value Cost Rate

Line	As Filed by Ms. Bulkley ¹	Corrected
	Step 1	Step 1
	<u>Consumer Price Index</u>	<u>Consumer Price Index²</u>
1	2017-2021 2.30%	2018-2022 2.30%
2	2022-2026 2.30%	2023-2027 2.30%
3	Average 2.30%	Average 2.30%
	<u>Consumer Price Index (All-Urban)</u>	<u>Consumer Price Index (All-Urban)³</u>
4	2015 2.37	2016 2.392
5	2026 2.94	2027 3.123
6	Compound Annual Growth Rate 1.98%	Compound Annual Growth Rate 2.46%
	<u>GDP Chain-type Price Index</u>	<u>GDP Chain-type Price Index³</u>
7	2015 1.11	2016 1.119
8	2026 1.34	2027 1.398
9	Compound Annual Growth Rate 1.74%	Compound Annual Growth Rate 2.05%
		<u>Market-Based Breakeven Inflation</u>
10		13-Week Average Nominal Yield ⁴ 2.64%
11		13-Week Average TIPS Yield ⁵ 0.92%
12		Breakeven Inflation ⁶ 1.70%
13	Average Inflation Forecast 2.01%	Average Inflation Forecast 2.13%
	Step 2	Step 2
	<u>Nominal U.S. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Year</u>	<u>Nominal U.S. Treasury Bond Yield, 30-Year</u>
14	2017-2021 4.80%	Current 13-Week Average ⁴ 2.64%
15	2022-2026 5.00%	3Q 2017 ⁷ 3.50%
16	Average 4.90%	Average 3.07%
17	Implied Real Risk Free Rate 2.84%	Implied Real Risk Free Rate ⁸ 0.92%
18		13-Week Average 30-Year TIPS Yield ⁵ 0.92%
19		Average Real Risk Free Rate 0.92%
20	50.0% of Real Risk Free Rate 1.42%	50.0% of Real Risk Free Rate 0.46%

Sources & Notes:

¹ Exhibit AEB-10, page 2.

² Blue Chip Economic Indicators, March 10, 2016, page 14.

³ EIA, Annual Energy Outlook 2016: Early Release, Table 20.

⁴ Exhibit MPG-15, page 1.

⁵ St. Louis Federal Reserve: Economic Research, <http://research.stlouisfed.org>.

⁶ $(1+2.64\%) / (1+0.92\%) - 1$.

⁷ Blue Chip Financial Forecasts, May 1, 2016, page 2.

⁸ $(1+3.07\%) / (1+2.13\%) - 1$.

Tucson Electric Power Company

13-Week Average 30-Year TIPS Yield

<u>Line</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Yield</u>
1	5/13/2016	0.79%
2	5/6/2016	0.86%
3	4/29/2016	0.82%
4	4/22/2016	0.92%
5	4/15/2016	0.84%
6	4/8/2016	0.81%
7	4/1/2016	0.83%
8	3/24/2016	0.95%
9	3/18/2016	0.94%
10	3/11/2016	1.09%
11	3/4/2016	1.02%
12	2/26/2016	1.04%
13	2/19/2016	1.11%
14	Average	0.92%